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DEFINING CHARTER-SCHOOL TEACHERS 
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ABSTRACT 
  As charter schools have flourished in form, they have also evolved 
in variety: parents can send their children to a trilingual immersion 
school or a school whose classes meet entirely online. The same 
flexibility that charters offer as an alternative to traditional public 
schools also makes them difficult to classify for purposes of labor law. 
When charter-school teachers form a union, it is not clear why the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and not a state labor 
analogue, should have jurisdiction over a charter-school labor dispute. 
And yet, the NLRB has asserted jurisdiction in most charter-school 
cases. This Note examines the NLRB’s test for determining whether the 
broad protections of the National Labor Relations Act apply to a group 
of workers in the context of charter-school employees. It proposes a 
more robust test for differentiating between charter schools for 
purposes of the Act, and it applies the test to two charter schools. 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 29, 2013, thirty Olney Charter High School teachers1 and 
their supporters waited to address ASPIRA, Inc. of Pennsylvania’s 
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nonprofit board.2 Some sat as others stood, because the board changed 
its bimonthly public-meeting location from its headquarters’ large 
meeting space to a cramped conference room at the eleventh hour. The 
teachers had come to ask the board to negotiate with the 65 percent of 
staff who had signed a petition in support of a union. Although the 
teachers had requested time on the agenda, the board relegated them 
to the public-comments section with a new two-minute-per-person 
time limit kept by a board member’s iPhone.3 As the meeting stretched 
past 9:00 p.m., the teachers asked the board to recognize their union 
and work with them. The board chair responded, “At this point we are 
not entering discussions . . . maybe at the next board meeting.”4 
For three years—through substantial staff turnover and changes 
in administration—the Olney teachers worked to gain recognition for 
their union. They worked with organizers from the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT), a national teachers union that had 
recently begun to help charter-school teachers launch union 
campaigns. They filed Unfair Labor Practice charges with the National 
Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) Regional Office in Philadelphia. 
The employer, ASPIRA, filed challenges to the NLRB’s jurisdiction 
over the dispute. Eventually, ASPIRA settled with the NLRB and 
agreed to post notices throughout the school building that it had 
interfered with the teachers’ right to unionize. In April of 2015, after a 
three-year organizing campaign, Olney Charter High School won its 
union under an election administered by the NLRB.5 But it is not clear 
why the NLRB, and not the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, has 
jurisdiction over this labor dispute.6 Charter-school teachers unions are 
new compared to public-school teachers unions, and charter schools 
 
 2. Jake Blumgart, Back to School for Labor, AM. PROSPECT (June 27, 2013), 
http://prospect.org/article/back-school-labor [https://perma.cc/TUC5-4HGL].  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Laura Benshoff, After Three Years, ASPIRA’s Olney Charter High School Says “Yes” to 
Union, NEWSWORKS (May 1, 2015), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/education/81381-
after-three-years-aspiras-olney-charter-high-school-says-yes-to-union [https://perma.cc/WRU8-
PB3U]. As of the publication of this Note, ASPIRA and the union still have not bargained for a 
contract. 
 6. After the election, ASPIRA, Inc. of Pennsylvania challenged the NLRB’s jurisdiction 
over certification, but then withdrew the challenge. See Olney Charter High Sch., an Aspira of 
PA Sch., Case No. 04-RC-148637 (N.L.R.B. July 22, 2015) (exception of employer to the hearing 
officer’s report on objection) (filing exceptions to NLRB Hearing Officer’s finding of jurisdiction 
over the employer after the union election); Olney Charter High Sch., an Aspira of PA Sch., Case 
No. 04-RC-148637 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 25, 2015) (executive secretary office letter) (acknowledging 
the employer’s withdrawal of exceptions and stating the NLRB will not act on the exceptions). 
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exist in something of a middle ground between public and private 
schools. Therefore, the question of whether the NLRB or state labor 
boards have jurisdiction over charter-school teachers unions remains 
relatively open. This Note examines the NLRB’s test for determining 
whether the broad protections of the National Labor Relations Act 
(the Act) apply to a group of workers in the context of charter-school 
employees. 
Teachers unions are some of America’s favorite villains in the 
story of public education.7 Why does this narrative have staying power? 
Simply put, almost everyone has had an ineffective teacher. And unlike 
an incompetent doctor or a surly DMV employee, an ineffective 
teacher holds power over his students for hours each week during those 
students’ formative years. Any organization devoting resources to 
ensuring that (even ineffective) teachers have some kind of process 
before being fired will likely draw the ire of those who have 
experienced bad teaching. After first winning their collective-
bargaining rights in the 1960s, public-sector teachers unions have 
grown in power and number over time, increasing teachers’ perceived 
professionalism and securing better working conditions, clearer 
systems for salary raises, and more generous pension benefits.8 
Teachers unions have also fought for job-security protections that can 
make terminating a teacher prohibitively expensive in terms of both 
money and time.9 
Enter charter schools. Initially invented by unionized teachers 
who wanted more flexibility,10 charter schools have been touted as a 
 
 7. See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, GOP Presidential Hopefuls Tested on Education Issues at N.H. 
Forum, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gop-
presidential-hopefuls-to-be-tested-on-education-issues-at-nh-forum/2015/08/18/ef63d62c-45dc-
11e5-846d-02792f854297story.html [https://perma.cc/6DXA-76TU] (“[New Jersey Governor 
Chris] Christie rehashed his now-famous line, declaring, ‘I have no problem with saying that the 
teachers’ unions deserve a political punch in the face, which they do.’”). 
 8. Richard D. Kahlenberg, The History of Collective Bargaining Among Teachers, in 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION 7, 7–11 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham 
eds., 2006). 
 9. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon in New York City, see generally Peter 
Kauffman, Note, Unionized Charter School Contracts as a Model for Reform of Public School Job 
Security, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1379 (2013).  
 10. See Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, The Original Charter School Vision, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/opinion/sunday/albert-shanker-the-
original-charter-school-visionary.html [https://perma.cc/2TVG-NNXA] (“In a 1988 address, 
[Albert Shanker, the president of the American Federation of Teachers] outlined an idea for a 
new kind of public school where teachers could experiment with fresh and innovative ways of 
reaching students.”). 
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near panacea by education reformers seeking to dismantle traditional 
public schools’ monopoly.11 Charters were designed to be small 
laboratories for effective education techniques, relaxing some of the 
red tape surrounding education to give teachers and administrators 
more flexibility over school designs.12 They evoke the hope that making 
public education more competitive will improve all schools.13 Charters 
have given parents—at least those who have the patience and resources 
to investigate schools, register for lotteries, and submit required 
paperwork—some choice over their children’s education.14 One 
problem for teachers unions is that many accomplishments by charter 
schools have been correlated, or at least associated with, the school’s 
ability to choose whether to employ unionized teachers.15 
Charter schools are also quickly becoming a cornerstone of many 
large urban school districts’ “portfolio plans,”16 which hand off low-
performing schools to charter providers for “turnaround” and create 
smaller, experimental schools, while maintaining their highest-
 
 11. DANNY WEIL, CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 213 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the 
potential for parents acting “as rational education consumers with the ability to take their business 
elsewhere . . . and force all schools to increase their efficiency”). 
 12. Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Charter School Idea Turns 20, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 25, 
2008), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/03/26/29kahlenberg_ep.h27.html [https://perma. 
cc/5QBS-WD62] (describing the early history of and vision for charter schools). 
 13. See WEIL, supra note 11, at 213. 
 14. See Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley & Jia Wang, Choice Without Equity: 
Charter School Segregation, 19 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 4 (2011). Frankenberg, 
Siegel-Hawley, and Wang write: 
A parent or student must first hear about the charter program . . . . The family must 
then navigate the application process, which often involves a lottery but also can mean 
a combination of other requirements like testing, teacher recommendations, parental 
involvement commitment, or essays. If the student is accepted, then transportation to 
and from the school may have to be provided by the parent.  
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Editorial, The Bias Inherent in Some Charter Schools’ Admissions 
Process, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-
charter-application-20160808-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/5F6E-SQXH] (detailing the 
“couple dozen pages” of application materials, including student and parent essays, and requests 
for medical history, that one LA charter school requires for admission). 
 15. Rachel M. Cohen, When Charters Go Union, AM. PROSPECT (June 18, 2015), 
http://prospect.org/article/when-charters-go-union [https://perma.cc/S27D-4GDH] (“By making 
it easier for principals to hire and fire staff, the proponents argued, schools could better ensure 
that only high-quality teachers would be working in the classrooms.”). Some of the highest-
performing charters, including the Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP), display exceptional 
results without unions. DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN 
SCHOOL SYSTEM 136 (2010). 
 16. For an explanation of portfolio plans, see ROBIN J. LAKE & PAUL T. HILL, 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN PORTFOLIO SCHOOL DISTRICTS 4–8 (Aug. 2009), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED532895.pdf [https://perma.cc/35MD-M7GN].  
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performing schools as traditional public ones.17 “Turnaround” or 
“restart” usually works something like this: the charter provider fires 
all the existing teachers and staff (who were previously under union 
collective-bargaining agreements), rehires some staff under at-will 
contracts, spruces up the school and curriculum, and reopens to serve 
the neighborhood with a heavy benefit of federal funding18 and less 
oversight by school-district officials.19 Turnaround schools are not the 
lottery-based charters featured in the popular documentary “Waiting 
for Superman.”20 Rather, turnaround charters continue to serve 
eligible students in a given neighborhood, just as the previous school 
did,21 and they may be required to enroll the same students as the 
 
 17. See Jeffrey R. Henig, Katrina E. Bulkley & Henry M. Levin,  
Can “Portfolio Management” Save Urban Schools?, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/10/06/06henig.h30.html [https://perma.cc/VQ33-TQ7B] 
(“[T]he movement [seeks] to shift from a centralized bureaucracy that directly manages a 
relatively uniform set of schools toward a model in which a central office oversees a diverse 
portfolio of schools that might include traditional public schools, privately managed schools, and 
charter schools.”). This model is gaining momentum in Chicago, New Orleans, New York City, 
and Philadelphia. Id. 
 18. Federal School Improvement Grants provide qualifying Title I schools with additional 
funding for three years after “turning around” and reopening. See JULIA CORBETT, NAT’L ALL. 
FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., CHARTERING TURNAROUND: LEVERAGING PUBLIC CHARTER 
SCHOOL AUTONOMY TO ADDRESS FAILURE 5 (Aug. 2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/turnaround_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KE6-JEV6] (“[S]upplementary 
district and state funds, federal Title I funds, and federal Race to the Top funds have also been 
used to turn around the country’s lowest-performing schools.”). This funding allows the 
turnaround schools to provide more services than the previously district-run schools during the 
first three years they are open. Some turnaround schools use this increased funding to improve 
working conditions for teachers by hiring more staff or implementing behavior improvement 
systems for disruptive students. See Institute of Education Sciences, Case Studies of Schools 
Receiving School Improvement Grants: Findings After the First Year of Implementation, at ix, 
82 (2014), https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20144015/pdf/20144015.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX3Y-
2XHM] (“Respondents from 15 of the 20 core sample schools that were implementing strategies 
to improve student behavior during school hours identified student behavior as part of the 
school’s performance problem.”).  
 19. See, e.g., FSG SOC. IMPACT ADVISORS, THE SCHOOL TURNAROUND FIELD GUIDE 4–5 
(2010), http://www.wallacefoundation.org/knowledge-center/school-leadership/district-policy-
and-practice/Documents/The-School-Turnaround-Field-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ7K-
685Y] (defining turnaround models and cataloguing various forms of federal funding available 
for turnarounds). 
 20. WAITING FOR SUPERMAN (Paramount Vantage 2010). 
 21. See, e.g., JEFF KUTASH, EVA NICO, EMILY GORIN, SAMIRA RAHMATULLAH & KATE 
TALLANT, U. CHI. CONSORTIUM ON CHI. SCH. RESEARCH, TURNING AROUND LOW-
PERFORMING SCHOOLS IN CHICAGO 6 (2012), https://consortium.uchicago.edu/sites/default/ 
files/publications/12CCSRTurnAround-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9ZC-Z7CR] (finding that 
turnaround schools “generally served the same students as before intervention”).  
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previous (public) school.22 Despite some charter schools’ similarities to 
traditional neighborhood schools, recent NLRB decisions have 
asserted jurisdiction over charter-school teachers unions. Thus, 
turnarounds can be considered private employers that are subject to 
NLRB jurisdiction instead of the state labor board.23 
To decide its jurisdictional reach, the NLRB applies a test from 
NLRB v. Natural Gas Utility District of Hawkins County,24 which 
determines whether an employer is a “political subdivision” exempt 
from the Act’s protections.25 An employing entity is a political 
subdivision subject to state labor law instead of the Act if it was “either 
(1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or 
administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by 
individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general 
electorate.”26 In its cases relating to charter-school unions, the NLRB 
has recently taken a more narrow approach to what both parts of the 
test mean.27 This approach has resulted in more charter schools being 
considered private employers subject to the Act’s jurisdiction over 
their labor disputes. 
At the charter movement’s outset, charters were more clearly akin 
to private schools with public funding. Now, however, large-scale 
charter providers are taking over previously public neighborhood 
schools and reopening them as charter schools as they serve the same 
geographic catchment area.28 Turnaround charter schools present 
 
 22. See, e.g., Facts, MASTERY CHARTER SCHS., http://www.masteryturnaround.org/
#!facts/jij4i [https://perma.cc/KD62-8C54] (“Unlike regular charter schools, [schools converted 
under Philadelphia School District’s “Renaissance Initiative”] are legally required to serve the 
same students from the surrounding neighborhood that they served while under District 
operation.”). 
 23. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ . . . shall not include . . . any State 
or political subdivision thereof.”). 
 24. NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cty., 402 U.S. 600 (1971). 
 25. Id. at 604–05. 
 26. Id. The NLRB may also decline jurisdiction if there is an insufficient link to commerce, 
but it rarely invokes this discretion. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (stating that the NLRB may “in its 
discretion . . . decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category 
of employers where, in the opinion of the board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is 
not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction”); cf. 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (2015) 
(stating that, as a rule, the NLRB will not assert jurisdiction over labor disputes involving horse 
racing and dog racing industries).  
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See Priscilla Wohlstetter, Joanna Smith, Caitlin Farrell, Guilbert Hentschke & Jennifer 
Hirman, How Funding Shapes the Growth of Charter Management Organizations: Is the Tail 
Wagging the Dog?, 37 J. EDUC. FIN. 150, 152–53 (2011) (describing how successful, scaled-up 
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more challenging working conditions that are leading to more union 
activity,29 and the question of whether state or federal labor agencies 
have jurisdiction is especially salient now. In addition, the NLRB is in 
the midst of expanding the Act’s protections to more employees and 
more activity,30 making it unlikely that the NLRB will decline 
jurisdiction by finding an employer exempt from the Act. Such an 
exemption could limit the protections available to unionized 
employees more broadly under the Act, and the NLRB is seeking to 
expand those protections.31 Recent cases, although not fully settling the 
issue because the NLRB uses a case-by-case determination, indicate 
that the NLRB will assert jurisdiction over charter schools in most 
circumstances. 
The NLRB’s interpretation of the Hawkins County test for 
whether to assert jurisdiction over a labor dispute currently does not 
take into account the unique situation of charter schools. This Note 
argues that as it applies the Hawkins County test, the NLRB needs to 
account for this growing sector of public education, or it risks treating 
all charters alike and granting itself what is effectively blanket 
jurisdiction over charter schools. Part I outlines the history of the 
charter movement and the changes that made some charter schools 
more similar to public employers. Part II examines the current test 
used by the NLRB to determine jurisdiction. Part III illustrates why 
that test does not account for the changes to the nature of charter 
schools and why the test should be adjusted. Part IV proposes a revised 
test to determine whether a school provider is public or private for 
purposes of NLRB jurisdiction. 
 
charter providers have been tapped to run turnaround schools under the Obama administration’s 
education plan). 
 29. See infra Part I. Beginning in 2007 and 2008, the AFT set up a national charter-organizing 
division, and today has organizers in seven cities: Los Angeles, Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, New 
Orleans, New York City, and Philadelphia. Cohen, supra note 15.  
 30. See Q&A with Duke’s Dan Bowling III, LAW 360 (Oct. 20, 2015, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/714655/q-a-with-duke-s-dan-bowling-iii [https://perma.cc/56C9-
LY8L]. 
 31. For example, the NLRB has issued a series of decisions expanding § 7 to apply to 
employers’ attempts to regulate employee social media use. See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp., 
358 N.L.R.B. 1100, 1101 (2012) (holding that a handbook rule violated the Act because it 
prohibited any online posting that could damage “any person’s reputation”); Hispanics United of 
Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769, at *1–2, *4 (Dec. 14, 2012) (holding that the 
employer violated the Act by firing employees who responded to a coworker’s criticism of their 
job performance by posting their own comments on Facebook).  
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I.  CHARTER SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS UNIONS 
This Part provides a backdrop for understanding the differences 
between traditional public schools and charter schools as well as 
emerging trends in the charter movement. It also explains the 
relationship between charter schools and teachers unions and why that 
relationship is now changing in a way that may increase the number of 
unionized charter schools. 
A. The Expansion of Charter Schools’ Role in Public Education 
The idea for charter schools first came from the president of 
America’s largest teachers union, the AFT.32 These schools were 
intended to free teachers, administrators, students, and parents from 
the bureaucracy of large school systems while maintaining public 
funding.33 In these “laboratory” schools, teachers would have the space 
to experiment with new educational approaches that could later be 
adopted by their larger public counterparts.34 
Unions were initially considered integral to this vision. Union 
representatives would sit on charter-authorizing boards, and faculty 
decisionmaking would remain integral to charter functioning.35 Some 
union protections were relaxed, however, to facilitate the schools’ 
effectiveness as the charter vision became reality. For example, many 
teachers unions’ collective-bargaining agreements place limits on the 
number of hours an employee can teach in a row without a break.36 By 
relaxing this standard, charter schools can more easily schedule classes, 
which may help them save money on hiring additional staff. 
The free-market movement quickly adopted the idea as a way to 
inject school choice into education.37 The trade was simple: in exchange 
 
 32. See Kahlenberg & Potter, supra note 10. In his speech, the president outlined a “new 
type of school,” and a few months later, he named his idea “charter schools,” referring to 
“explorers” who received charters to seek new land and resources. Id. 
 33. Sandra Vergari, Introduction to THE CHARTER SCHOOL LANDSCAPE 1, 10 (2002). 
 34. Kahlenberg & Potter, supra note 10. 
 35. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, A SMARTER CHARTER 8 (2014). 
 36. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BALTIMORE TEACHERS UNION AND BALTIMORE 
CITY BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS 26 (2010–2013), http://www.baltimorecityschools.org/ 
cms/lib/MD01001351/Centricity/Domain/243/PDF/BTU20102013FinalTeacher_Agreement[1]
.pdf [https://perma.cc/48WR-3WZX] [hereinafter BALTIMORE TEACHERS UNION CONTRACT] 
(“Secondary teachers shall not be required to teach continuously for more than three (3) periods, 
nor three (3) hours where double periods are used. Elementary teachers shall not be required to 
teach continuously for more than three (3) hours.”).  
 37. See WEIL, supra note 11, at 213. 
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for the freedom to experiment with curriculum and structure, charter 
schools must produce results or risk losing their charter. The 
aforementioned freedom would lead to more competition and better 
choices for students and parents, while the additional accountability 
would increase the quality of each school. 
Both sides of the political spectrum embraced charter schools as a 
solution for the problems they perceived to be plaguing public 
education in the United States.38 The line of reasoning is now familiar: 
“Government-run schools, said a new generation of reformers, are 
ineffective because they are a monopoly; as such, they have no 
incentive to do better, and they serve the interests of adults who work 
in the system, not children.”39 Versions of this rhetoric can be seen in 
entertainment media portraying charter schools as a solution to poorly 
run traditional public schools and the racial achievement gap.40 Charter 
schools are usually operated by nonprofit boards41 while traditional 
public schools are run by school boards in some way accountable to the 
electorate.42 
There was one charter school in the United States in 1992.43 By the 
2013–14 school year, there were 6,465 charter schools44 educating over 
2.5 million students.45 Some districts have an even higher ratio: after 
Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans almost completely dismantled its 
public education system and replaced it with a market-based charter 
system.46 Nationwide, 61 percent of charter schools serve populations 
in which more than 60 percent of students qualify for free or reduced-
 
 38. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see RAVITCH, supra note 15, at 9–10. 
 39. Id. at 10. 
 40. See, e.g., WAITING FOR SUPERMAN, supra note 20; WON’T BACK DOWN (20th Century 
Fox 2012).  
 41. WEIL, supra note 11, at 350. 
 42. ALLAN C. ORNSTEIN, DANIEL U. LEVINE & GERALD L. GUTEK, FOUNDATIONS OF 
EDUCATION 209 (11th ed. 2011). 
 43. Peter Jacobs, Here’s How America’s First-Ever Charter School Got Off the Ground, BUS. 
INSIDER (June 20, 2015, 2:52 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/inside-the-first-charter-
school-in-america-city-academy-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/G7F7-VWXF].  
 44. Institute of Education Sciences, The Condition of Education 2016, at xxiv (2016), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016144.pdf [https://perma.cc/24D6-4N3R]. 
 45.  Id. at xxiii. 
 46. See NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., DETAILS FROM THE DASHBOARD: CHARTER 
SCHOOL RACE/ETHNICITY DEMOGRAPHICS 2 (2012), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/NAPCS-2010-2011-Race_Ethnicity-Details-from-the-
Dashboard_20120516T152831.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LN9-UGLQ] (providing data for New 
Orleans’ charter market share suggesting that charter schools represented 70 percent of New 
Orleans schools in 2012). 
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price lunch under the federal National School Lunch Program, a 
measure that provides a rough approximation of the concentration of 
low-income students at a given school.47 In the 2012–13 school year, 
black students made up 15 percent of the national student population 
attending traditional public schools, but they constituted 28.5 percent 
of the students attending charter schools.48 
Although initially intended as laboratories to provide the best 
aspects of both public and private education, charter schools have 
taken on a new role. Especially in large urban school districts, in which 
cash-strapped centralized leadership seeks out more economically 
feasible options, charter-school operators are being tapped to take 
over “failing” schools.49 Charter schools are also growing larger in 
terms of population,50 possibly due to the turnaround phenomenon or 
the increased demand among parents for charter schools.51 Moreover, 
in some cities, “charter chains” operate multiple schools or provide a 
 
 47. CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, SURVEY OF AMERICA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS 2014, THE 
ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO CHARTER SCHOOL OPERATIONS 9 (2014), https://www.edreform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/2014CharterSchoolSurveyFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6YD-5FTC]; 
see also Institute for Education Sciences, supra note 44, at 111 (“In school year 2012–13, the 
percentage of students attending high-poverty schools—schools in which more than 75 percent of 
students qualify for free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL) under the National School Lunch 
Program—was higher for charter school students (36 percent) than for traditional public-school 
students (23 percent).”). 
 48. NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., Total Number of Schools, THE PUBLIC 
CHARTER SCHOOLS DASHBOARD (2012), http://www.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/
page/overview/year/2012 [https://perma.cc/2DGE-ZDR3].  
 49. See, e.g., David Uberti, New Orleans’ Switch to Charter Schools After Katrina: A 
“Takeover” or a Success?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/aug/27/new-orleans-recovery-school-district-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/5LBE-
TCVU]. As Uberti explains: 
[In November 2005,] [t]he legislature voted to raise the criteria that allowed the state 
to take over schools deemed ‘failing’, giving the [New Orleans Recovery School 
District] control of more than 100 of New Orleans’s public schools performing below 
the state average. The remaining high-performing schools stayed under control of the 
locally elected school board, creating a bifurcated governing structure.  
Id. 
  Both nonprofit charter management organizations (CMOs) and for-profit education 
management organizations (EMOs) enter into contracts with schools or school districts to provide 
services to students, generally by operating a school or a smaller learning community within a 
school. CORBETT, supra note 18, at 5. To avoid confusion, this Note refers to both CMOs and 
EMOs as “charter providers” or “charter operators” and will differentiate between nonprofit and 
for-profit charter providers when salient to the analysis. 
 50. Institute of Education Sciences, supra note 44, at 78 (“[C]harter schools have generally 
increased in enrollment . . . . [T]he percentages of charter schools with 300–499, 500–999, and 
1,000 or more students each increased . . . .”). 
 51. This observation is my own speculation as many turnaround charter schools are larger in 
size, which would skew the percentages of charter schools that are larger as opposed to smaller. 
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pathway for students to attend only schools within the charter 
operator’s network.52 For example, Green Dot Public Schools (Green 
Dot) is a nonprofit charter provider that manages twenty-two schools 
in Los Angeles, Memphis, and Washington state.53 Many charter chains 
are adding to their network of smaller, lottery-based charters by 
bidding to take over “failing” schools using the turnaround model. 
Turnaround charter schools present different challenges from 
“new-start” charter schools.54 For instance, new-start charter schools 
can use a lottery system to admit only students whose families have 
applied and won a slot.55 They usually are not required to admit 
students just because they live in a certain neighborhood catchment 
zone, and they do not have to admit students throughout the school 
year.56 They also typically start with one grade—for example, 8th grade 
or kindergarten—and add one grade each year rather than opening a 
full school.57 New-start charters may also be permitted to expel 
students or counsel them to withdraw more easily than public schools  
 
 52. KIPP schools are one example of a successful “charter chain.” The KIPP network 
includes 183 schools in 20 states and the District of Columbia. Kipp Schools, KIPP, 
http://www.kipp.org/schools [https://perma.cc/P4B6-PPGX]. KIPP has recently adapted its model 
to turnaround schools in Newark, New Jersey. See Leslie Brody, Charter Market Makes the Grade 
in N.J. School, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 25, 2015, 11:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/charter-
network-makes-the-grade-in-n-j-school-1445822242 [https://perma.cc/8J8L-XND9] (detailing the 
turnaround process at KIPP’s Life Academy in Newark, New Jersey). 
 53. CORBETT, supra note 18, at 9. Some of Green Dot’s charters are more “traditional” 
programs that build grade by grade, but in 2008, Green Dot began taking over existing public 
schools under California’s charter-school “trigger” laws, which allow a takeover when 51 percent 
of tenured teachers vote to turn over the school to a charter operator. Id. 
 54. Id. at 4, 7. 
 55. See id. at 16 (“[N]ew start charter schools . . . determine enrollment through lottery if 
there are insufficient seats available and can choose whether or not to backfill empty seats.”). 
 56. See id. at 11, 21 (noting that new-start charter schools do not have to accept students 
throughout the school year). 
 57. See id. at 9 (noting that in the traditional charter-school practice, one grade is added at a 
time). 
DEGORY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  9:59 AM 
390 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:379 
can.58 Expelled or “counseled out”59 students then often transfer to 
traditional neighborhood public schools.60 New-start charters may also 
not need to admit a new student to replace each expelled student.61 
This allows the charter to establish and maintain school culture while 
limiting the negative effect of students coming and going throughout 
the school year.62 In contrast, a turnaround school may have to admit 
students from the neighborhood zone at any point in the school year—
without a parent application or lottery—and may not have the 
authority to expel students except for extreme acts.63 Turnaround 
schools also require the charter provider to take over all grades at once, 
so they may have students from grades 9–12 who were accustomed to 
 
 58. While some charter schools are required by the terms of their charter to follow the local 
school district’s expulsion policies, others have the freedom to create their own policies that make 
it easier to expel students. See Jaclyn Zubrzycki, Sean Cavanagh & Michele McNeil, Charter 
Schools’ Discipline Policies Face Scrutiny, EDUC. WEEK (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.edweek.org/ 
ew/articles/2013/02/20/21charters_ep.h32.html [https://perma.cc/UF34-QG4M] (“The fact that 
many charter schools set their own expulsion procedures means that it can be hard to get a neutral 
hearing, and many parents do not know their children’s rights” (quoting Professor Sarah Jane 
Forman)); see, e.g., Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Alex Richards, CPS: Expulsion Rate Higher at 
Charter Schools, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-26/news/ 
ct-chicago-schools-discipline-met-20140226_1_charter-schools-andrew-broy-district-run-schools 
[https://perma.cc/EA4J-KB73] (“[D]uring the last school year, 307 students were kicked out of 
[Chicago] charter schools, which have a total enrollment of about 50,000. In district-run schools, 
there were 182 kids expelled out of a student body of more than 353,000.”).  
 59. See Michael Winerip, Message from a Charter School: Thrive or Transfer, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/11/nyregion/charter-school-sends-message-
thrive-or-transfer.html [https://perma.cc/BW6A-3UF7] (discussing a parent’s experience with a 
charter school that, after disciplining him multiple times, suggested she find a school with a 
smaller class size for her son, and then helped refer him to a public school); Zubrzycki, Cavanagh 
& McNeil, supra note 58 (referring to the practice of advising parents to seek another school for 
their children as “counseling out”).  
 60. See Zubrzycki, Cavanagh & McNeil, supra note 58 (presenting studies on this claim).  
 61. See id. (citing a study of KIPP schools that found that students who left KIPP “were not 
replaced, a fact that might benefit the KIPP network’s academic performance by creating a 
positive peer effect”). 
 62. See Sara Mead, To Backfill or Not to Backfill?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 11, 
2015, 12:45 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/06/11/charter-school-
backfill-question-has-no-simple-answer [https://perma.cc/7T2F-7K4A] (“Leaders in these schools 
argue that limiting enrollment to certain grade levels, or to the start of the school year, allows 
them to create and maintain a cohesive school culture and ensure that all students can meet high 
expectations.”).  
 63. See, e.g., CORBETT, supra note 18, at 9 (“At Locke HS we receive 10–15 new students a 
week every week, all the way until the last week of school. . . . [This] is indeed disruptive to the 
culture and classroom structures that have been set up.” (quoting Marco Petruzzi, CEO of Green 
Dot)). 
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their poorly performing school and now are under new leadership with 
new teachers.64 
These specific difficulties that turnaround charters face—as 
compared to new-start charters—along with administrators’ freedom 
from traditional school-district bureaucracy (something that all 
charters enjoy), make turnaround schools a particularly challenging 
place for teachers to work.65 For example, a teacher at a turnaround 
school may teach eleventh graders who had spent two years in their 
traditional public high school before the turnaround, have unaddressed 
behavioral issues, and are academically behind by a grade level or 
more. Due to its designation as a “default” or “neighborhood school,” 
the charter provider would not be able to expel or refuse to admit any 
students with major behavioral issues, as opposed to new-start charters, 
which would.66 At the same time, the turnaround-charter provider may 
demand more from the teacher than a traditional unionized public 
school. For example, the charter provider may base the teacher’s pay 
on her students’ performance on standardized tests67 rather than the 
bargained-for “lockstep” pay method that many public schools have.68 
The charter provider may place thirty-five or forty students in her 
classroom69 and require her to teach them for longer periods at a time 
than the bargained-for allotment at the traditional public school.70 The 
charter provider will likely also be able to terminate her at will based 
 
 64. See id. at 10–11 (discussing the challenges turnaround schools face). 
 65. See Sarah Karp, At Turnarounds, a Revolving Door for Most Teachers, CATALYST CHI. 
(Apr. 17, 2014), http://catalyst-chicago.org/2014/04/turnarounds-revolving-door-most-teachers/ 
[https://perma.cc/2M78-LHYD] (“At 16 of the 17 schools that underwent a turnaround between 
2007 and 2011, more than half of teachers hired in the first year of the turnaround left by the third 
year.”). 
 66. See CORBETT, supra note 18, at 9 (discussing one turnaround charter and noting that 
“[s]tudents are accepted year-round in any grade . . . and with any disability; students are rarely 
expelled . . . ; students are enrolled as they register to attend the school, regardless of whether 
there are openings; and no application or lottery is required”). 
 67. See Sarena Goodman & Lesley Turner, Teacher Incentive Pay and Educational 
Outcomes: Evidence from the NYC Bonus Program 5 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Program on Educ. 
Policy and Governance Working Papers Series, PEPG 10-07, 2010), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ 
pepg/MeritPayPapers/goodman_turner_10-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN39-QMET]. 
 68. See, e.g., BALTIMORE TEACHERS UNION CONTRACT, supra note 36, at 61–63 (detailing 
the schedule of teacher salary based on number of years or “steps” of experience the teacher has). 
 69. Cf. Courtney L. Malloy & Priscilla Wohlstetter, Working Conditions in Charter Schools: 
What’s the Appeal for Teachers?, 35 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 219, 232–33 (2003) (discussing the 
higher student-to-teacher ratio often found at charter schools). 
 70. See BALTIMORE TEACHERS UNION CONTRACT, supra note 36, at 26 (noting that class 
size is a bargained-for part of the contract). 
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on how she handles her students’ behavioral challenges.71 These 
working conditions, although similar among charter schools, may be 
more arduous than both new-start charters and unionized public 
schools because turnaround schools cannot easily expel or refuse to 
admit students, making it difficult to maintain a stable school culture. 
This problem could lead charter-school teachers to want to form 
unions with their coworkers, even though the intent behind charter 
schools was to create an alternative to a unionized public school. 
B. The Changing Relationship Between Charter Schools and 
Teachers Unions 
Teachers forming or opposing unions within the public-school 
system is nothing new. Charter schools, however, add a novel element 
to the discussion because charter advocates have offered a union-free 
atmosphere as one of the benefits of charter schools. Understanding 
the connection between charter schools and teachers unions is 
important to understanding why not all teachers unions are alike and 
why labor law needs to account for these differences. 
Charters and unions have had an uneasy relationship.72 There are 
a finite number of education jobs available, and in cities where charters 
enroll students who would usually go to traditional public schools, 
every new charter school means fewer jobs for unionized teachers.73 In 
some cities, however, charter-school employees are entitled to 
representation by the same union that represents the traditional public-
school teachers.74 Hiring freezes have occurred in some cities because 
of decreasing public-school enrollment, due to charter-school growth, 
which has added to the tension between charter schools and teachers 
 
 71. See WEIL, supra note 11, at 425 (“[T]he management of anti-union charter schools insist 
that the only acceptable standard of employment is ‘at-will employment.’”).  
 72. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15 (quoting a charter-school teacher who questioned 
supporting a union that spent years attacking the charter-school movement in California).  
 73. See NAT’L CHARTER SCH. RESEARCH PROJECT, THE FUTURE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 
AND TEACHERS UNIONS 1 (2006), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED495839.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8K7W-5AMV] (discussing how teachers unions consider charter schools “direct threats to 
teachers unions, since charter school teachers generally do not need to join existing collective 
bargaining units”). 
 74. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.270(b) (West 2015) (“All provisions of an existing 
negotiated agreement or collective bargaining agreement applicable to a teacher or employee of 
a district apply to that teacher or employee if employed at a charter school in that district, unless 
the district and the bargaining unit . . . agree to an exemption.”); Martin H. Malin & Charles 
Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate 
Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 885, 931 & nn.237–38 (2007) (listing states submitting 
charter schools to existing collective-bargaining agreements). 
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unions.75 As a result, new teachers who would join the public-sector 
teachers union now work at mostly non-union charters.76 
The two largest U.S. teachers unions, the AFT and the National 
Education Association (NEA), openly opposed charter schools once 
the charter movement began to tout union-free schools as better than 
unionized ones.77 In a recent move that may reflect both pragmatism78 
and solidarity with charter teachers,79 the AFT and NEA are 
organizing unions in charter schools. In 2007, the AFT began a national 
effort to organize charters and placed organizers in seven major cities.80 
The NEA also expressed support for organizing charters and has 
organized charter schools in New Jersey and California.81 Having 
initially fought the authorization of charter schools as a threat to the 
public-school system, unions have changed their stance. Charter 
schools are here to stay, but there is a lack of regulation and oversight 
of bad charter schools, which creates space for unionization as a 
potential disciplining tool for the charter system.82 Additionally, 
although 68 percent of K–12 public-school teachers belong to unions, 
only 7 percent of charter-school teachers do,83 making charter schools 
ripe for new unions (and thus new members). 
 
 75. See, e.g., Danny Valentine, To Deal with Cut in Funding, Hernando School District 
Implements Hiring Freeze, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 3, 2014, 4:58 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/education/k12/the-deal-with-cut-in-funding-hernando-school-
district-implements-hiring/2173421 [https://perma.cc/6DJJ-YA6E] (“For the second time this 
school year, the Hernando County School District has implemented a hiring freeze to address 
budget concerns that are largely tied to the district’s declining enrollment.”). 
 76. See Winnie Hu, Teachers Facing Weakest Market in Years, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/nyregion/20teachers.html [https://perma.cc/G7WK-2MA9] 
(“Charter schools, which are publicly financed but independently run, are practically the only 
ones hiring in New York and elsewhere because of growing enrollments amid expanding political 
and economic support for school choice.”). 
 77. Cohen, supra note 15. 
 78. See id. (“Critics argue that unions’ newfound interest in charter teachers, then, is just a 
ploy to collect more membership dues.”). 
 79. See id. (“[The AFT and the NEA] recognized that such new national initiatives as the 
Common Core standards and President Obama’s Race for the Top meant that teachers at charter 
and traditional public schools faced similar challenges that the unions could help them address.”). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Meet NEA’s Charter School Members, NEA, http://www.nea.org/home/60799.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XF79-JNKE]. 
 82. Elias Isquith, Charter Schools’ Worst Nightmare: A Pro-Union Movement May Change 
Charters Forever, SALON (July 18, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/2015/07/ 
18/charter_schools_worst_nightmare_a_pro_union_movement_may_change_charters_forever/ 
[https://perma.cc/6Y5M-RSEJ]. 
 83. THE CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 47, at 13 (stating that of 7 percent of charter-
school teachers who are unionized, half are unionized only because state law stipulates that they 
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By decentralizing union power into smaller bargaining units and 
working with individual charter providers to negotiate less entrenched 
contracts, independent charter-school unions may provide an 
opportunity to break up large, inefficient public-sector employee 
unions. Most charter-union contracts—devoid of the power built over 
time by the teachers union—provide an intermediate level of job 
protection to charter employees. They give more protection than the 
at-will contracts most charter teachers currently work under but less 
protection than the traditional public-school union contracts do.84 This 
level of protection may address some of the ills that charter-school 
teachers face without the inefficiencies of the larger collective-
bargaining unit.85 
This type of charter-by-charter unionizing could occur under 
either state or federal labor jurisdiction. Consider the following 
scenario: a teacher repeatedly speaks up in meetings to question an 
administrator’s policy that a student who is out of uniform must 
automatically be suspended. Under an at-will contract common at most 
charter schools, the teacher may find herself without a job at the end 
of the school year, and the employer does not need to provide a 
justification for the decision.86 Under a unionized-charter contract, the 
administrator may need to provide a reason for letting a teacher go or 
have formal meetings with the teacher that show she is not making 
progress according to predetermined standards.87 Under a traditional 
union contract in areas where the teachers union has built up 
bargaining power over time, the teacher may be entitled to continue to 
work or wait in a “rubber room”88 until a formal hearing, where the 
 
follow their district’s collective-bargaining agreement, and this number has dropped from 12 
percent).  
 84. For an explanation of the spectrum of job protection under different types of contracts 
with teachers, see Kauffman, supra note 9, at 1412–13. I am indebted to Kauffman for his analysis 
of the New York City Teachers Union Contract, which informed this argument and pointed me 
to some of the provisions described below. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. The teacher will still have the same civil-rights protections and state employment-law 
protections. Id. 
 87. See UNITED FED’N OF TEACHERS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE UNITED FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS art. 21(A) (2014), http://www.uft.org/files/attachments/moa-contract-2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZYB4-PQE2] [hereinafter N.Y.C. TEACHERS UNION CONTRACT] (outlining 
the process for principals to document a teacher’s poor performance to assign an “unsatisfactory” 
rating). 
 88. The “rubber room” refers to the practice of sending teachers accused of misconduct to a 
“temporary reassignment center” while the charges against them are pending. Steven Brill, The 
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administrator will have to present proof of the teacher’s ineffectiveness 
or insubordination and the administrator’s attempts to remedy the 
situation.89 
The landscape of laws governing charter-school unions differs 
from state to state. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia 
exclude charter schools from school-district collective-bargaining 
agreements.90 Other states explicitly include charter-school employees 
in the public-sector teachers union in their state.91 Still others outlaw 
public-sector employee unions but are silent on charter-school 
unions.92 
Charter-school providers’ responses to unionization have varied. 
Some charter networks, such as Green Dot, have embraced unions and 
bargained with their teachers to create contracts that reflect the 
interests of both sides.93 Others have engaged in protracted battles with 
 
Rubber Room, NEW YORKER (Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2009/08/31/the-rubber-room [https://perma.cc/F4RL-Y2UV]. Brill describes a wasteful 
purgatory for teachers who are waiting for charges against them to be handled by an arbitrator:  
The teachers have been in the Rubber Room for an average of about three years, doing 
the same thing every day—which is pretty much nothing at all. Watched over by two 
private security guards and two city Department of Education supervisors, they punch 
a time clock for the same hours that they would have kept at school—typically, eight-
fifteen to three-fifteen. Like all teachers, they have the summer off. The city’s contract 
with their union, the United Federation of Teachers, requires that charges against them 
be heard by an arbitrator, and until the charges are resolved—the process is often 
endless—they will continue to draw their salaries and accrue pensions and other 
benefits. 
Id. 
  The official “rubber rooms” were shut down as part of an agreement between the city 
and the teachers union—no doubt in part due to the public-relations firestorm the practice 
caused—but New York City teachers are now being reassigned inside their own schools in so-
called “solitary confinement rubber rooms.” Ben Chapman, Troubled City Teachers Still 
Bouncing Around the Supposedly Shutdown ‘Rubber Rooms’ as City Wastes $22 Million a Year, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/education/
city-schools-rubber-rooms-bounce-back-article-1.1184406 [https://perma.cc/WYN3-TNYK]. 
 89. See N.Y.C. TEACHERS UNION CONTRACT, supra note 87, at art. 21(G) (discussing the 
“section 3020-a hearing” process for tenured teachers). 
 90. NAT’L ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., MEASURING UP TO THE MODEL: A RANKING OF 
STATE CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS 11 tbl.14 (6th ed. 2015), http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/model_law_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM4E-X8P5]. Those states and 
territories are: Arizona, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming. Id. 
 91. Malin & Kerchner, supra note 74, at 931. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Rebecca Vevea, Unions Move In at Chicago Charter Schools, and Resistance Is Swift, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/08/us/08cncharter.html 
[https://perma.cc/GLB5-R9NV] (describing Green Dot’s response). 
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teachers seeking to unionize.94 Some charter providers have even 
decided to walk away from their schools after the schools’ teachers 
voted to unionize.95 These varying responses all occur with the overlay 
of the jurisdictional question, and sometimes intersect with it, as either 
the union or the charter provider may use challenges to jurisdiction as 
a tool to get its way in negotiations.96 
II.  THE NLRB’S CURRENT TEST FOR JURISDICTION AND ITS 
APPLICATION IN CHARTER-SCHOOL UNION CASES 
To understand how federal jurisdiction over charter schools may 
have different effects, some background on the Act is necessary. In 
passing the Act, Congress intended to encourage collective 
bargaining.97 The NLRB, which regulates collective bargaining,98 has 
the primary responsibility of protecting employees’ rights under the 
Act but also must balance these against the rights of the employer and 
the union as a whole.99 Section 7 of the Act—the section pertaining to 
the rights of employees—offers broad protections to employees 
seeking to protest working conditions or to collectively bargain for 
terms and conditions of their employment.100 This Note concerns the 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Kyle Feldscher, Charter School Company Ends Relationship with School After 
Teachers Announce Unionization Vote, MLIVE (Apr. 17, 2015, 3:19 PM), 
http://www.mlive.com/lansing-news/index.ssf/2015/04/charter_school_company_decides.html 
[https://perma.cc/XCZ2-8VSM] (“New Urban Learning [has announced it] will end its 
relationship with University Yes Academy. Teachers at University Yes Academy will be voting 
on whether to unionize on May 6.”). 
 96. See infra Part IV.B. 
 97. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (stating that the purpose of the Act is to “encourag[e] the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining”). 
 98. The NLRB is composed of five Board members (appointed by the President), a General 
Counsel, regional directors, and administrative law judges. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)–(b) (discussing 
the NLRB’s structure). A three-member board decides routine cases, but the entire five-member 
Board decides more important cases. See AM. BAR ASS’N., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2826 
(John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012). 
 99. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228–29 (1963) (recognizing the role of 
the courts in analyzing Unfair Labor Practices as “weighing the interests of employees in 
concerted activity against the interest of the employer in operating his business in a particular 
manner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy the intended consequences upon 
employee rights against the business ends”); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American 
Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1536–37 (2002) (discussing the potentially conflicting 
protections afforded to employers and employees). 
 100. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 7 of the Act makes it an “unfair labor practice” for employers 
“to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees” while employees are exercising their collective-
bargaining rights. Id. §§ 151–169. After a union is certified to collectively bargain on behalf of its 
member-employees, employers are required by the Act to bargain in good faith on “wages, hours, 
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test the NLRB uses to determine whether these protections should 
extend to charter-school employee unions. 
The protections of the Act do not apply to public employees. An 
employer may be exempt from NLRB jurisdiction if it is a “political 
subdivision” under § 2(2) of the Act.101 When employees seek the 
protection of the Act in an election,102 the employer may challenge the 
NLRB’s jurisdiction over the dispute.103 An employer may claim that it 
is a “political subdivision” under § 2(2) and therefore exempt from the 
provisions of the Act. Section A of this Part explains the test for 
determining whether an employer is a political subdivision and traces 
the NLRB’s changing interpretation of that test as it applies to charter 
schools. Section B then discusses the Act’s coverage of charter schools 
under the NLRB’s current application of its jurisdictional test. Section 
C explores the implications for both employers and employees of 
applying the Act to charter schools. 
A. The Hawkins County Test 
The NLRB applies the test from Hawkins County to determine if 
an employer is a “political subdivision.”104 Under Hawkins County, an 
 
and other terms and conditions of employment.” If an employer fails to bargain on one of these 
subjects, it is considered an “unfair labor practice.” Additional unfair labor practices pertinent to 
teacher unionization include threatening to fire employees for union activity, Schaeff Inc. v. 
NLRB, 113 F.3d 264, 266 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1997), surveilling union meetings, Consol. Edison Co. v. 
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938), and offering “super-seniority” to employees who refuse to take 
part in union activity, Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 231. The adjudication of unfair labor 
practices is often where jurisdictional challenges arise. E.g., Instituto del Progreso Latino, Case 
No. 13-RM-001771 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 30, 2010) (decision & order). Employees and their union 
representatives may file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, which the Board then 
investigates. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c), 160(b), 161e; 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (2011); The NLRB Process, 
NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process [https://perma.cc/3VKR-Q627]. If the 
Regional Director finds merit in the charge, she will file a formal complaint against the employer, 
often first referring the case to arbitration. NLRB, supra. If the case is not settled, it goes before 
an Administrative Law Judge of the NLRB, whose decision can be appealed. Id. 
 101. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).  
 102. Unions, employers, and employees may file a petition for an NLRB representation 
election. The petition must be supported by at least 30 percent of the employees in the bargaining 
unit. After a petition has been filed, the Regional Director investigates whether the NLRB has 
jurisdiction over the employer or if there are any other obstacles. If the Regional Director orders 
that an election be held, it is conducted by secret ballot by a representative of the regional office, 
with an appeal procedure if there is some error in the process. Jurisdictional challenges may also 
be filed in the appeals process. Id. § 159(c). 
 103. See Id. §§ 159(c), 160(b), 161; 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (2011); NLRB, supra note 100. 
Jurisdictional challenges also typically arise when employees file Unfair Labor Practices with the 
NLRB to enforce the protections of the Act.  
 104. NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cty., 402 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1971). 
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employing entity is a political subdivision subject to state labor law, not 
the Act, if it was either “(1) created directly by the state, so as to 
constitute [a] department[] or administrative arm[] of the government, 
or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public 
officials or to the general electorate.”105 In Hawkins County, the 
Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the Act, observing 
that public employers were exempted from the Act to avoid protecting 
governmental employees’ right to strike.106 The Court noted that 
federal law is controlling in the analysis of whether an employer is a 
political subdivision, but state law is given “careful consideration.”107 
The NLRB, in applying Hawkins County, has found a state’s 
characterization of the employer and its statutory scheme to be weighty 
factors in the political-subdivision analysis.108 The NLRB, therefore, 
conducts a fact-specific analysis of the state’s legislation creating or 
enabling the employer in order to determine whether the employer 
meets the Hawkins County test.109 Thus, the employer does not need to 
be a government agency to be an exempt political subdivision.110 
As of the 2010s, the NLRB is pursuing expansion of its 
jurisdiction.111 In the face of multiple states restricting protection of 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 604 (“Congress enacted the § 2(2) exemption to except from Board cognizance 
the labor relations of federal, state, and municipal governments, since governmental employees 
did not usually enjoy the right to strike.”).  
 107. Id. at 602 (quoting Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cty., 167 N.L.R.B. 691, 691 (1967)). 
 108. E.g., Hinds Cty. Human Res. Agency, 331 N.L.R.B. 1404, 1404 (2000). 
 109. See, e.g., Research Found. of the City Univ. of N.Y., 337 N.L.R.B. 965, 968 (2002) 
(analyzing the CUNY structure, the state enabling legislation, the composition of the board of 
directors, and the extent to which the board of directors is responsible for enacting CUNY 
policies).  
 110. See Hinds County, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1404 (“It is well established that the National Labor 
Relations Board recognizes entities created by county governments pursuant to an enabling state 
statute, as having been directly created by the state under Hawkins.”). Even if the employer is 
not considered a “political subdivision,” the NLRB may also “decline to assert jurisdiction over 
any labor dispute . . . where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on 
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 164(c)(1) (2012). This practice is rare, however, due to the expansive definition of “commerce.” 
See, e.g., Mich. Eye Bank, 265 N.L.R.B. 1377, 1380 (1982) (asserting jurisdiction over a nonprofit 
corporation engaged in distributing corneal transplant tissue). 
 111. For an exploration of this phenomenon in the religious-school context, see generally 
Christian Vareika, Note, Further and Further, Amen: Expanded National Labor Relations Board 
Jurisdiction over Religious Schools, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2057 (2015). Labor law, as compared to other 
bodies of law, is relatively unsettled. This is partially due to partisan appointments. See Joseph 
Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. (2013) 511, 511–12 & n.5 (describing the NLRB’s “changing positions on various 
issues depending on which party was in power”). Also, the NLRB has historically relied on 
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union activity, and perhaps motivated by partisan politics, the NLRB 
extended the protections of the Act to more and more employees, even 
including those who would be considered public.112 This expansion of 
jurisdiction affects charter schools, which are a growing sector of 
unionized employees.113 
B. Hawkins County Applied to Charter Schools 
Whether the NLRB will assert jurisdiction over a labor dispute 
involving a charter school is a case-by-case determination.114 This 
Section clarifies the jurisdictional test the NLRB applies to decide 
whether to exempt a charter provider-employer from the Act’s 
protections and the changes to the NLRB’s interpretation of this test 
by reviewing several charter-school cases from the 2000s and 2010s, 
including two recent cases decided in 2016 that clarified the NLRB’s 
approach to charter-school teachers unions. 
 
adjudication, rather than formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, to make rules. See NLRB v. 
Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 817 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Despite the fact that 
the NLRB has explicit rulemaking authority . . . it has chosen—unlike any other major agency of 
the Federal Government—to make almost all its policy through adjudication.” (citation 
omitted)). This practice results in unsettled doctrine because unlike Article III courts, the 
NLRB’s policies and decisions are not subject to stare decisis. NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 
347, 348 (7th Cir. 1971).  
 112. See LAW 360, Q&A with Duke’s Dan Bowling III, supra note 30. Professor Bowling 
states:  
The NLRB is in the midst of an aggressive expansion of the definition of concerted 
activity, one so broad as to bring virtually all private sector employees in the U.S. under 
the [Act’s] protective umbrella. This includes everything from employees complaining 
about a boss on Facebook to employees chatting about work issues on the Internet with 
co-workers. 
Id. 
  The NLRB has also created its own web page encouraging nonunion employees to file 
Unfair Labor Practices. NLRB E-File, NLRB, https://apps.nlrb.gov/chargeandpetition/#/ 
[https://perma.cc/UY7E-RUXN]. Additionally, the NLRB has liberalized other statutory 
definitions, such as who is a “joint employer,” in ways that may subject more employers to liability 
for unfair labor practices. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, slip op. 
at 17 (Aug. 27, 2015). 
 113. For a discussion of the growth of charter-school unions, see supra Part I. 
 114. See, e.g., Press Release, NLRB Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Invites Briefs Regarding 
Charter School Jurisdiction (Jan. 10, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-
invites-briefs-regarding-charter-school-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/3XVK-DP39] (“State 
charter school laws vary, and NLRB regional directors have both asserted jurisdiction in 
some charter school cases and declined it in others. [Chicago Mathematics, a charter-school 
teachers union case up for NLRB review,] could provide further guidance as to 
when charter schools fall under NLRB jurisdiction.”). The NLRB’s recent approach to charter 
cases suggests that it will assert jurisdiction in many, if not all, charter school cases. For further 
discussion on this point, see infra notes 145–87 and accompanying text. 
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Charter schools present a particular conundrum for applying the 
Hawkins County test: although charter schools may receive public 
funding or be authorized by state statutes, nonprofit boards composed 
of private individuals usually manage them.115 This factor differentiates 
them from public schools, which are managed by local school boards 
created by the state and made up of officials accountable to either the 
electorate or the state government.116 Additionally, charter schools are 
not all alike. They may be more like private schools (not exempt from 
the Act) or more like traditional public schools (exempt from the 
Act).117 
The jurisdictional test was initially murky when charter-school 
unionization expanded. In early charter-school cases applying the 
Hawkins County test, as highlighted below, NLRB Regional Directors 
differed regarding the factors required by the test. This difference led 
to varied results depending on the factual scenario. In some cases, the 
charter school was considered exempt from the Act’s jurisdiction; in 
others, the NLRB asserted jurisdiction. Now, however, the NLRB has 
narrowed its focus under Hawkins County such that no recent case has 
found a charter school an exempt political subdivision. 
For an early example, in Los Angeles Leadership Academy,118 the 
teachers union, which was organized under the NEA, sought 
 
 115. Facts About Charters, NAT’L. ALL. FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., http://www.publiccharters. 
org/get-the-facts/public-charter-schools/faqs [https://perma.cc/T7VB-DHUG].  
 116. In Philadelphia, for instance, the state legislature has taken over the school board and a 
“Reform Commission” appointed by the governor manages the city schools. See generally Eva 
Travers, Philadelphia School Reform: Historical Roots and Reflections on the 2002–2003 School 
Year Under State Takeover, 2 PENN GSE PERSP. ON URB. EDUC. 2 (2003). 
 117. The NLRB has encountered a similar issue to charter schools in deciding whether to 
extend protection to employees of private nonprofit schools that state and local governments have 
contracted with to provide special education services. This issue has been fairly settled since the 
1970s. In these cases, the NLRB did not find jurisdiction over the employers. E.g., Laurel Haven 
Sch. for Exceptional Children, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1197 (1977); Overbrook Sch. for the Blind, 213 
N.L.R.B. 511 (1974). The NLRB’s reasoning in the special education cases weighed the public 
and private aspects of the employer. In Overbrook, the NLRB considered a school that provided 
educational services to the blind and deaf-blind students of the Philadelphia area. Overbrook, 213 
N.L.R.B. at 511. Rather than using the Hawkins County test, it found that the “special relationship 
to the public school system” made the school essentially public, not private, and therefore not 
subject to the NLRB’s jurisdiction. Id. at 513. The NLRB also emphasized substance over form 
in its opinion, looking to the school’s activities and programming rather than its classification as 
a private, nonprofit school. Id. The NLRB has not used this same reasoning for its charter-school 
cases, however, which may be in part due to the changing composition of the NLRB based on the 
President appointing its members. 
 118. L.A. Leadership Acad., Case No. 31-RM-1281 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 2, 2006) (decision & 
order). This decision was issued by a Regional Director and is therefore nonprecedential to 
govern future NLRB decisions, but several other Board decisions have relied on its reasoning, 
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recognition under the California Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB).119 That charter school was a new-start charter, not a 
turnaround school.120 The charter school wanted the Act’s coverage, 
contending it was a private employer subject to NLRB jurisdiction.121 
The Regional Director122 concluded that the charter school was a 
political subdivision, exempt from the Act under § 2(2), and dismissed 
the employer’s petition seeking NLRB jurisdiction.123 Although the 
Regional Director’s decision is not binding on other labor disputes, its 
reasoning is instructive to illustrate a broader reading of Hawkins 
County—one that would classify more charter schools as political 
subdivisions (similar to their public-school counterparts) and limit the 
Act’s jurisdiction over charter schools. 
The Regional Director applied the Hawkins County test and 
concluded that the charter school could be a political subdivision under 
either prong of the test.124 Under the first prong (“created directly by 
the state”),125 he found that the state’s enabling legislation for charter 
schools,126 the statutory scheme applying to the charter,127 and the 
 
and its interpretation of the Hawkins County test is more robust than the current test the NLRB 
uses.  
 119. Id. at 1.  
 120. Id. at 5 n.4.  
 121. Id. For a discussion of why a union or an employer might want the Act’s coverage as 
opposed to state PERB coverage, and vice-versa, see infra Part II.C.  
 122. The NLRB’s Regional Directors work within the NLRB’s Office of General Counsel 
and head the field offices. Eileen B. Goldsmith, The Role of Regional Directors in the National 
Labor Relations Board 1 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
labor_law/meetings/2011/ac2011/165.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E5D-S5BL]. Their 
role is to substantively enforce the Act’s provisions, and they have both investigatory and 
adjudicative responsibilities as delegated to them by the NLRB under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 159 
(2012); Goldsmith, supra. Although their authority is broad, the Regional Directors’ decisions 
“are guided by the Board’s case law and various internal guidelines, and are subject to varying 
degrees of review.” Id.  
 123. Los Angeles Leadership, Case No. 31-RM-1281, at 2.  
 124. Id. at 3.  
 125. NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cty., 402 U.S. 600, 604 (1971). 
 126. See Los Angeles Leadership, Case No. 31-RM-1281, at 7 (“On March 12, 2002, [the Los 
Angeles Unified School District] finally approved the Academy’s charter petition for a five-year 
term, the maximum time permitted under the [California Charter Schools Act of 1992].”); id. at 
5 (“The California legislature unequivocally declared its intent that ‘Charter Schools are part of 
the Public School System, as defined in Article 9 of the California constitution.[’]”). 
 127. Id. at 5. 
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public funding making up the majority of the school’s revenue128 
pointed to the charter being a public entity.129 
Under the second prong (“administered by individuals who are 
responsible to public officials or to the general electorate”),130 the 
Director examined the enabling statute,131 the Los Angeles Unified 
School District’s oversight of the Academy’s budget,132 and the 
Academy’s reporting requirements133 to determine that the charter was 
a political subdivision under the second prong of Hawkins County as 
well.134 Other Regional Director decisions have found charter schools 
exempt under one or both prongs of Hawkins County.135 
Despite the Regional Directors’ previous decisions finding charter 
schools exempt from the Act, in the more recent cases involving 
charter schools, the NLRB has used a narrower interpretation of 
Hawkins County. In these cases, the NLRB interpreted the Hawkins 
County test to determine that most charter schools are not political 
subdivisions, so they are considered “Employers” under the Act.136 
Although this is not a bright-line rule,137 all of the NLRB decisions in 
this area since 2012 have found the charter schools to be “Employers” 
under the Act’s jurisdiction.138 The NLRB expounded on the legal 
 
 128. See id. at 8–9 (detailing the sources of the charter school’s funding: $2,175,097 from state 
funds, $315,573 from federal funds, and $469,900 from private sources).  
 129. Id. 
 130. Hawkins Cty., 402 U.S. at 604–05. 
 131. See Los Angeles Leadership, Case No. 31-RM-1281, at 12–13 (quoting CAL. EDUC. CODE 
§ 47612(a) (West 2013)). 
 132. See id. at 13 (detailing the layers of oversight of financial records and budget by 
LAUSD). 
 133. See id. (“While the Academy has a board of directors that makes governance decisions, 
the Academy is not excused from many regulations and reporting requirements that apply to all 
public schools.”). 
 134. Id. at 15.  
 135. E.g., Instituto del Progreso Latino, Case No. 13-RM-1771 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 30, 2010) 
(decision & order) (finding the employer exempt under the second prong of Hawkins County 
because its administration is responsible to public officials or to the general electorate). 
 136. E.g., Hyde Leadership Charter School—Brooklyn, Case No. 29-RM-126444, 364 
N.L.R.B. No 88 slip op. at 1 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 24, 2016) (board decision); Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., 
Case No. 04-RC-143831, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87 slip op. at 1 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 24, 2016) (board 
decision); Pa. Cyber Charter Sch., Case No. 06-RC-120811 (N.L.R.B. Apr. 9, 2014) (board 
decision). 
 137. Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 1 (“We are not announcing a bright-line rule 
asserting jurisdiction over charter schools nationwide.”). 
 138. E.g., Hyde Leadership, Case No. 29-RM-12644, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88 (decision & 
direction of election); Pilsen Wellness Ctr., Case No. 13-RM-001770 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 8, 2013) 
(board decision). 
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reasoning for protecting charter-school employees in twin decisions 
issued on August 24, 2016: Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School139 and 
Hyde Leadership Charter School—Brooklyn.140 These cases adopted 
the reasoning the NLRB used in Chicago Mathematics & Science 
Academy Charter School, Inc.,141 which was previously invalidated by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning.142 The 
reasoning behind this interpretation is different than the reasoning in 
Los Angeles Leadership discussed above.143 Because Regional 
Directors are supposed to follow NLRB decisions, Pennsylvania 
Virtual and Hyde Leadership provide the analysis that Regional 
Directors will likely use in the future to determine whether the NLRB 
has jurisdiction over charter-school teachers unions.144 
 
 139. Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., Case No. 04-RC-143831, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 
24, 2016) (board decision). 
 140. Hyde Leadership Charter School—Brooklyn, Case No. 29-RM-126444, 364 N.L.R.B. 
No. 88 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 24, 2016) (board decision).  
 141. Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (Dec. 14, 2012), 
invalidated by NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).  
 142. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). In Noel Canning, the Supreme Court 
determined that the NLRB was improperly constituted when it ordered Noel Canning to execute 
a collective-bargaining agreement because the President had improperly used his recess-
appointment power for three of the five members of the Board. Id. at 2558, 2578. The NLRB may 
not operate without a quorum of three properly appointed members. New Process Steel, L.P. v. 
NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 676 (2010). The improperly constituted NLRB decided cases between 
January 2012 and August 2013, all of which may be invalid under Noel Canning. Some of these 
cases represented a departure from existing NLRB precedent according to some commentators. 
See, e.g., Phillip Bauknight, Suzanne Peters, Michael Lotito, Tessa Gelbman, Janeen Feinberg & 
Brandon Gearhart, Recent Developments in Employment Law and Litigation, 49 TORT TRIAL & 
INS. PRAC. L.J. 157, 170–173 (2013). Two of the cases asserting NLRB jurisdiction over charter 
schools, Chicago Mathematics and Pilsen Wellness, were decided during this time period and were 
issued by improperly constituted boards, meaning it is likely that they are invalid. See Hyde 
Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 3 n.7 (stating that Noel Canning rendered Chicago 
Mathematics invalid). So the decisions may not have precedential value because they are invalid 
for lack of quorum. Federal courts have treated decisions made without a lawful quorum as 
without precedential value. See, e.g., San Miguel Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB, Nos. 08–1245, 08–1300, 
2010 WL 4227318, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 20, 2010) (vacating the NLRB’s decision). The properly 
constituted NLRB has, however, adopted the reasoning of the charter-school cases in subsequent 
decisions where it found jurisdiction. E.g., Pa. Cyber Charter Sch., Case No. 06-RC-120811 
(N.L.R.B. Apr. 9, 2014) (order).  
 143. See supra notes 119–35 and accompanying text. 
 144. At least one Regional Director had already considered the nullified reasoning in Chicago 
Mathematics to overturn the analysis that Los Angeles Leadership used to find that the school was 
not a political subdivision. John B. Stetson Charter Sch., an Aspira of PA Sch., Case No. 04-RC-
151011, at 7 n.6 (N.L.R.B. May 14, 2015) (regional director’s decision & direction of election) 
(“Since the decision was issued before the NLRB’s decisions in Chicago Mathematics and 
Pennsylvania Cyber, I find it to be of limited value in evaluating the NLRB’s current views.”). 
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Interestingly, in the two recent charter-school cases, the union and 
the employer were on different sides of the jurisdictional dispute, 
illustrating that the interests in unionization under national or state 
labor law do not always cut the same way. In Pennsylvania Virtual, the 
union contended that the NLRB had jurisdiction because the school 
was not an exempt political subdivision, and the employer opposed 
NLRB jurisdiction.145 In Hyde Leadership, however, the parties were 
flipped: the union contended that the charter school was an exempt 
subdivision, and the employer favored NLRB jurisdiction.146 
These two charter schools presented somewhat similar factual 
scenarios, and under the NLRB’s analysis, both were considered not 
exempt under the political-subdivision exemption to § 2(2) employers. 
In Pennsylvania Virtual, the school was a cyber charter school,147 which 
had to admit any eligible student who qualified as an in-state resident 
under Pennsylvania law.148 A nonprofit board operated the school 
under an agreement with a local school district.149 The school received 
97 percent of its funding from the school districts its students would 
otherwise attend but for their enrollment in the cyber charter school, 
and the remaining 3 percent came from federal sources.150 The school 
was a new-start charter school, not a turnaround school. 
In Hyde Leadership, the charter school was also a new-start 
charter, which opened in 2010 as a brick-and-mortar (not a cyber) 
school. As is common with New York schools, Hyde Leadership was 
“co-located”151 and operated in the same building as a traditional 
public elementary school in Brooklyn.152 A nonprofit board of trustees 
operated the school.153 The school received 91 percent of its funding 
 
 145. Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 4.  
 146. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 4. 
 147. Cyber charter schools are charter schools operated remotely, with students attending 
online classes and activities. For an overview of cyber charter schools, see generally Luis A. 
Huerta, Chad d’Entremont & Maria-Fernanda Gonzalez, Cyber Charter Schools: Can 
Accountability Keep Pace with Innovation?, 88 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 23 (2006). 
 148. Pa. Virtual, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 1.  
 149. Id., slip op. at 3. 
 150. Id. 
 151. STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. CHARTER SCH. INST., THE ROLE OF THE AUTHORIZER IN THE 
CO-LOCATION OF CHARTER SCHOOLS IN EXISTING PUBLIC SCHOOL SPACE IN NEW YORK CITY 
(2016), https://www.suny.edu/about/leadership/board-of-trustees/meetings/webcastdocs/IV_Co-
Location%20Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3TR-9AN6] 
 152. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 2. 
 153. Id.  
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from state sources, 8 percent from federal sources, and 1 percent from 
private donations or “other income.”154 
In Pennsylvania Virtual, the full NLRB, as opposed to a three-
member panel, heard the case,155 signaling its importance.156 It applied 
the same analysis and reached the same result in Hyde Leadership.157 
In both cases, the NLRB reviewed158 a Regional Director’s decision 
and affirmed it, concluding that the charter school was not an exempt 
political subdivision under either prong of the Hawkins County test.159 
Neither Pennsylvania nor New York allows charter-school employees 
to unionize in the same bargaining units as public-school employees’ 
bargaining units,160 so the teachers could have organized under either 
state or federal labor law.161 Additionally, the NLRB rejected calls to 
decline jurisdiction as a discretionary matter.162 In its explanation of 
why it would not decline jurisdiction, it provided a more extensive 
discussion of the policy issues relating to charter-school teachers 
unions than it had previously given.163 
In both cases, when examining the first prong of Hawkins County, 
the NLRB found that private individuals—acting through private 
corporations—created charter schools through the framework 
provided by the enabling statute. Thus, the schools were not created by 
a public entity under this analysis.164 The NLRB also compared the 
charter providers to government contractors, another group that is not 
 
 154. Id., slip op. at 3. 
 155. Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 1. 
 156. See supra note 98. A three-member panel decided Hyde Leadership. Hyde Leadership, 
364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 1. 
 157. See Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 5 (applying the test “[a]s stated in 
Pennsylvania Virtual Charter School”). 
 158. Any party may file a petition for the NLRB to review a regional director’s decision. 29 
C.F.R. § 102.67(a)–(b) (2015). 
 159. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 1; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip 
op. at 3. 
 160. New York does allow charter-school employees in schools with fewer than 250 students 
to be represented by the same union as local school-district employees, but not the same 
bargaining unit. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 2 (citing New York Charter 
Schools Act of 1998, N.Y. Educ. Law. Ch. 16, Title II, Art. 56 (2014)). 
 161. See id. (discussing New York’s charter-school laws); Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 
slip op. at 1 (discussing Pennsylvania’s charter-school laws). 
 162. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 7; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip 
op. at 9. 
 163. See, e.g., Chi. Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41, at 1 
(Dec. 14, 2012) (discussing only the Hawkins County test and its findings on this point). 
 164. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 5; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip 
op. at 5. 
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necessarily exempt from NLRB jurisdiction.165 In Pennsylvania Virtual, 
the NLRB went a step further in its analysis, finding that the charter 
school was not created to be an “administrative arm of the 
government.”166 Despite the state statutory scheme’s characterization 
of charter administrators as “public officials” and the schools as “public 
schools,” the NLRB stated that federal, not state, law governs whether 
an entity is an exempt political subdivision.167 In Hyde Leadership, 
however, the NLRB declined to examine whether the charter school 
was an administrative arm.168 The NLRB’s refusal to examine how the 
state characterized the charter school differed from Los Angeles 
Leadership, where the Regional Director considered the state’s 
characterization of the charter school to be an important factor.169 
Under Hawkins County’s second prong, the NLRB focused on the 
bylaws of the charter schools’ nonprofit boards, which in both cases did 
not allow public officials to elect or remove board members.170 The 
NLRB gave “accountability” a literal meaning here: “accountability to 
public officials” meant that the NLRB officials needed to be removable 
by a public official.171 Thus, in Hyde Leadership, despite the fact that 
the New York Board of Regents has some power to remove a trustee 
of a charter school for malfeasance, the NLRB considered this power 
too limited to make the charter trustees responsible to public 
officials.172 This reasoning differs from the reasoning in Los Angeles 
Leadership that applied a broader view to “accountability,” including 
reporting requirements and special education statutes applying to the 
charter school, which would require charter school officials to answer 
to state entities.173 
After concluding that the charter schools were not political 
subdivisions under Hawkins County, in Pennsylvania Virtual and Hyde 
Leadership the NLRB provided policy reasons for asserting 
 
 165. See Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 5 (“The Board routinely asserts 
jurisdiction over private employers that have agreements with government entities to provide 
services.”); Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 5 (using the exact same language). 
 166. Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 6. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 6 n.6. 
 169. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.  
 170. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 6; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip 
op. at 8. 
 171.  Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 6; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 
slip op. at 8. 
 172. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 7. 
 173. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction over the case instead of using its statutory prerogative to 
refuse jurisdiction.174 In particular, the NLRB rejected arguments that 
asserting jurisdiction would “lead to instability and confusion.”175 In 
Pennsylvania Virtual, the NLRB addressed this issue at length, 
disagreeing with the dissent that its test lacked predictability.176 It 
stated, “Although a case-by-case analysis lacks the predictability of a 
categorical exemption, it results in greater fidelity to the Act in each 
case. And, as more cases are decided, predictability will no doubt 
emerge.”177 While rejecting a bright-line determination on charter 
schools, the NLRB declared, “[A] categorical exemption of charter 
schools would not effectuate the purposes of the Act.”178 
In both Pennsylvania Virtual and Hyde Leadership, NLRB 
Member Miscimarra wrote dissents detailing why both schools should 
be considered exempt political subdivisions under both Hawkins 
County prongs. He noted that even if § 2(2) jurisdiction were found, 
the NLRB should decline to assert its jurisdiction in both cases.179 
In Hyde Leadership, the dissent emphasized that under Hawkins 
County’s first prong, New York’s statutory scheme characterized the 
charter school as an administrative arm of the state. Further, it stated 
that the school did not exist until the New York Board of Regents 
created the school through the issuance of a charter.180 Additionally, 
the Board of Regents may terminate or choose not to renew the 
school’s certificate of incorporation if the school mishandles funds or 
fails in its educational mission.181 Under the second prong, the dissent 
opined that the Board of Regents appointed the school’s initial board 
of trustees because it technically provided the names of trustees in its 
certificate of incorporation.182 The Board of Regents may also remove 
 
 174. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 7–9; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 
slip op. at 9–11; see supra note 26. 
 175. Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 9; see Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 
slip op. at 8 (“[T]he Union argues that PERB retains jurisdiction over some charter-school 
employees, such as employees of pre-existing public schools that have been converted to charter 
schools, and that it would therefore be irrational to subject other charter-school employees to the 
jurisdiction of the NLRB.”). 
 176. Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, slip op. at 10. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 9–16; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 
slip op. at 11–18. 
 180. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 12. 
 181. Id., slip op. at 13. 
 182. Id. 
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a board member if it finds she falsified her background or financial 
disclosure information.183 Thus, according to the dissent’s view of the 
facts, the charter school should be exempt under either prong of the 
Hawkins County test. 
In both Pennsylvania Virtual and Hyde Leadership, the dissents 
argued that the NLRB should decline to assert jurisdiction over the 
charter schools as well as other similar charter-school cases.184 The 
dissents emphasized that providing public education is primarily a state 
and local concern, so it should not be subject to the Act.185 They also 
discussed the instability that the NLRB’s decisions would create in this 
area186 and predicted continued “protracted disputes that are not 
definitively resolved until many or most students (and many teachers 
and other employees) have come and gone.”187 
Despite these policy concerns, the reasoning from Pennsylvania 
Virtual and Hyde Leadership appears to be what the NLRB will apply 
in future charter-school cases. This analysis uses a rule that looks 
primarily at the charter school’s board of directors and whether they 
were elected or appointed by government officials. The two recent 
cases illustrate how the NLRB is broadly asserting jurisdiction over 
charter schools by narrowing the political-subdivision exemption for 
charter schools. 
C. Implications of Applying the Act 
 A looming question is whether the Act should be applied to more 
employees nationwide in an era where unions are under attack. 
Although this Note does not seek to address this question, it discusses 
the implications of such an expansive view as concerning charter 
schools. This Section examines, through the lens of charter schools, 
why employees or employers may prefer unionization under either 
state labor laws or federal labor laws. 
There are costs and benefits to seeking the protections of the Act, 
and charter providers and teachers may be on opposite sides of the 
jurisdictional debate depending on a particular state’s statutory 
 
 183. Id., slip op. at 14. 
 184. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 14; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 
slip op. at 12. 
 185. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 14; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 
slip op. at 13. 
 186. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 15; Pa. Virtual, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 
slip op. at 16. 
 187. Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, slip op. at 15. 
DEGORY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/27/2016  9:59 AM 
2016]  CHARTER-SCHOOL TEACHERS UNIONS 409 
overlay.188 For instance, in a state where public-sector employee unions 
have been abolished by statute, charter-school teachers may seek the 
protections of the Act and want their school to be declared a private 
employer.189 Some commentators argue that an expansion of 
jurisdiction could benefit teachers unions in the long run because the 
NLRB may frustrate right-to-work statutes,190 which authorize 
employees to decide whether to join an existing union rather than 
automatically being considered a part of the bargaining unit upon 
accepting a job.191 
On the other hand, when state law makes it easier to initially 
organize a union, teachers may prefer state law.192 For instance, in some 
states, a union may win recognition by the state labor board by showing 
that a majority of the employees have signed union membership 
cards.193 This process is colloquially referred to as a “card-check” 
election and may be easier to win than a secret-ballot election, because 
it does not require employees to vote in a potentially contentious 
environment. Additionally, employees may sign their cards before 
employers have the chance to make their case against unionization in 
a “captive audience” presentation.194 Therefore, employers in these 
 
 188. In Hyde Leadership, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88, the United Federation of Teachers (AFT, 
AFL-CIO) wanted state (New York) jurisdiction over the matter. In the Pennsylvania cases, the 
AFT-affiliated unions sought federal jurisdiction.  
 189. This scenario presents federalism concerns, which will be briefly addressed infra Parts 
III and IV. 
 190. E.g., Malin & Kerchner, supra note 74, at 931.  
 191. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 540 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 192. The longer an election period, the greater the potential for union campaigns to stall or 
fail. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract 
Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN 
LABOR LAW 75, 78 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994) (finding that the union win rate was 
higher the sooner the election was held, and stating that “if certification could be achieved by card 
checks rather than elections, union win rates would nearly double” in campaigns where a majority 
of workers had signed cards); cf. Steven Abraham, Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Card 
Check vs. NLRB Elections: Stock Market and First Contract Effects (Rutgers Sch. of Mgmt. and 
Labor Relations Research Brief No. 7, 2009) (discussing stock market responses to union 
organizing efforts in card check and NLRB elections). 
 193. River W. Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 311 N.L.R.B. 591, 595 (1993). 
 194. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 192, at 82 (finding that captive audience meetings 
decrease union win rates). See generally Christopher Beam, Uncivil Union: Does Card Check Kill 
the Secret Ballot or Not?, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2009, 7:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/politics/2009/03/uncivil_union.html [https://perma.cc/2HBN-ZNKE] (discussing 
“card-check” elections and the secret ballot).  
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states may prefer the election processes of the Act to the state-level 
card-check election process.195 
In addition to the initial union-certification process, which may be 
more difficult for unions under federal rather than state law,196 state 
law may also prove substantively better or worse for postcertification 
union activity. For instance, in case of an impasse in contract 
negotiations, state law may require employers to participate in 
mediation or binding-interest arbitration to obtain a final contract.197 
The Act imposes no such requirement on employers and may allow 
employers to make unilateral changes in the event of an impasse.198 
Therefore, if an employer has bargained in good faith, it can 
unilaterally implement its last offer to the union if an impasse in 
negotiations is reached, whereas state law may be more favorable to 
the union.199 
In contrast to state laws on impasse that may favor unions, the Act 
is more favorable to strikes than some state labor laws. The Act 
protects employees’ right to strike,200 a practice that many states have 
 
 195. The Act provides for a secret-ballot election process, which may be lengthier than the 
card-check authorization process. Some states, including Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
and Utah allow employers to challenge card checks with a secret-ballot election. Thus, even if the 
union has shown a majority of employees support it under a state law card-check process, the 
employer may order ballot election. See Press Release, NLRB Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB 
Advises Attorneys General in Four States that Secret-Ballot Amendments Conflict with Federal 
Labor Laws (Jan. 14, 2011), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-advises-
attorneys-general-four-states-secret-ballot-amendments [https://perma.cc/4AZR-GFMA].  
 196. In some cases, such as where public-sector employee unions have been outlawed under 
state law, certification may only be possible under federal law, and by classifying the employer as 
not a political subdivision. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (providing that “employers” shall not 
include political subdivisions). 
 197. E.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney 2016). 
 198. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 (1962). 
 199. State law may provide such advantages as requiring a mediation, a fact-finding hearing, 
a published report, and a public hearing, all of which would pressure employers to settle. See N.Y. 
CIV. SERV. LAW § 209 (establishing formal, state labor board-monitored procedures to help 
resolve negotiating impasses). 
 200. 29 U.S.C. § 142(2). 
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outlawed by statute.201 Beyond strikes, the Act also protects a broader 
class of employee actions even if there is no union in the first place.202 
Another key difference is the Act’s exclusion of supervisors from 
the bargaining unit.203 Under the Act’s logic, supervisors owe 
undivided loyalty to the employer because they are considered to be 
on the management “team,” meaning they would not have to be 
represented by a union. Under some state laws, supervisors may gain 
representation as long as they are in a different bargaining unit from 
the employees they supervise.204 This difference may cut in favor of 
unions wanting state jurisdiction because their union could include not 
only employees but also supervisors, strengthening their union’s 
bargaining power and clout. 
For example, in a charter-school setting, “teacher coaches” or 
department chairs—who are not principals but still have some 
authority—may be considered “employee supervisors” because they 
have the authority to evaluate or monitor teachers. This kind of 
accountability is a hallmark of charter schools. Under state law, these 
supervisors could become part of their own union. Under the Act, 
however, these supervisors could be excluded from the union and 
considered “management.” 
The protections described above envision industrial unionism,205 
but they may not be suitable for where the charter-school movement is 
headed. In the long term, the Act may be a poor vehicle to advance 
teachers’ rights because it anticipates industrial unionism, in which 
 
 201. E.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210 (barring public employees from striking and instituting 
penalties against unions and employees for violating the provision); see MILLA SANES & JOHN 
SCHMITT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE STATES (2014), http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-
2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q58W-CA29] (providing data on state regulation of public 
employees’ rights under state law). 
 202. 29 U.S.C. § 157. The Act guarantees employees the right to engage in protected 
“concerted activities,” such as engaging peacefully in activity for their “mutual aid or protection” 
relating to terms and conditions of their employment. Id. One example would be refusing to work 
past a certain time as a protest to show administration the value of the unpaid work that many 
teachers do outside of their official contractual hours.  
 203. Id. § 152(3) (defining employees who receive protection as “any employee . . . but shall 
not include any individual . . . employed as a supervisor”). 
 204. E.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 201 (excluding managers with significant control over 
employees from the bargaining unit). 
 205. Malin & Kerchner, supra note 74, at 899 (“[Under the industrial union model] a worker’s 
role is to obey and not to think.”). 
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workers seek protection from abusive management policies.206 Many 
charter-school teachers want something more than industrial unionism. 
Some are interested in an evolving role for unions in social justice.207 
Others express interest in “professional unionism,”208 which uses the 
union as a disciplining and educational force on the members’ 
professional activity rather than spending resources to protect 
ineffective teachers with only small improvements in working 
conditions.209 Much of the literature encouraging charter-school 
teachers to organize uses language such as “having a voice” in 
management decisions.210 The Act, however, delineates between 
management and employees, and if charter-school teachers want a 
“voice” in decisionmaking, the Act may not protect some of their 
activity because it would bring them closer to a management role.211 
III.  THE CURRENT TEST’S WEAKNESS WHEN APPLIED TO CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 
As of the publication of this Note, the nature of the public-school 
system is changing, especially in large urban areas. The number of 
students enrolled in charter schools is growing annually, and larger 
charter providers are actively seeking out contracts to “turn around” 
 
 206. Id. This is a long-term view based on changes in charter teachers’ interests; in the short 
term, teachers may simply want protection from arduous working conditions. See supra notes 69–
71 and accompanying text. 
 207. See, e.g., Cindy Long, Social Justice Activism Is Forming a More Perfect (and Enduring) 
Union, NEA TODAY (Sept. 28, 2015), http://neatoday.org/2015/09/28/social-justice-activism-is-
forming-a-more-perfect-and-enduring-union [https://perma.cc/2Y82-ELT6] (discussing 
unionized teachers’ interests in activism beyond “bread and butter” (in other words, wages and 
hours) concerns, including professional development, increasing resources for students and 
families, and anti-racism education).  
 208. See Charles T. Kerchner & Julie E. Koppich, Organizing Around Quality: The Frontiers 
of Teacher Unionism, in CONFLICTING MISSIONS?: TEACHERS UNIONS AND EDUCATIONAL 
REFORM 281, 290 (Tom Loveless ed., 2000) (discussing an increased emphasis on peer review 
among union reformers). 
 209. Professional unionism emphasizes “police your own”-style measures. See id. (noting an 
Ohio teachers’ contract “in which the teachers agreed to police the ranks of their veterans in 
return for the right to review new teachers”). Such measures may include teachers reviewing each 
other’s work (rather than administrators reviewing their work), and they affirm a “legitimate role 
for teachers in establishing and enforcing standards in their own occupation.” Malin & Kerchner, 
supra note 74, at 904. 
 210. See, e.g., AFT and Charter Schools, ACTS CHICAGO, http://www.chicagoacts.org/about-
us/aft-and-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/R997-YH3M] (“A strong teacher voice supported by 
a union is essential to achieving fairness in the workplace and improving academic outcomes.”). 
 211. For an explanation of why the Act is potentially ill-suited to address charter-school 
teachers’ interests in unionization, see Malin & Kerchner, supra note 74, at 899. 
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public schools and reap the benefits of public funding for such efforts. 
Additionally, the largest teachers unions—the AFT and the NEA—are 
devoting resources to organizing staff at charter schools. Although the 
current number of organized charter employees is relatively small, 
challenging working conditions at turnaround schools and other 
charters with less independence may lead to an increase in organizing 
activity. Such a change could lead to larger numbers of teachers 
protected under the Act rather than by state law. This Part examines 
the problems with the NLRB’s current application of the Hawkins 
County test, namely how it hurts employers and employees while also 
harming the federal–state balance. 
Despite the NLRB’s efforts to disavow a bright-line jurisdictional 
rule for charter schools, its current interpretation of Hawkins County’s 
first prong212 seems unlikely to ever exempt nonprofit charter providers 
in public education. Under the current test, as long as private 
individuals create a nonprofit board, a nonprofit charter will not satisfy 
the first prong of Hawkins County no matter how closely they resemble 
public schools.213 Charter schools are usually managed by nonprofit 
boards created by private individuals,214 so they are unlikely to ever be 
considered “public” under the NLRB’s interpretation in Pennsylvania 
Virtual and Hyde Leadership. 
Additionally, charter schools are highly unlikely to pass the 
NLRB’s interpretation of the second prong of Hawkins County 
because the members of a nonprofit board are unlikely to have 
positions where they are directly appointable or removable by public 
officials.215 Although the NLRB emphasized it did not create a bright-
line test, the realities of charter schools mean that it has: the NLRB will 
exert jurisdiction over labor disputes involving charter schools 
managed by private boards. 
As a policy matter, the NLRB’s current interpretation of the 
Hawkins County test as applied to charter schools also implicates the 
federal–state balance. Public education has traditionally fallen under 
 
 212. For a description of this line of cases, see supra Part II.B.  
 213. For instance, imagine a community group creates a nonprofit board that applies for a 
contract to operate a school that will be the “default” school for students in a particular 
neighborhood. Further, suppose that school receives 90 percent of its funding from public sources 
and retains all the same teachers as the previous public school. Under the first prong of Hawkins 
County, this school would still not be considered a public employer. 
 214. WEIL, supra note 11, at 350. 
 215. For a discussion of the Board’s narrowing of its interpretation of the second prong of the 
test, see supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.  
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the states’ police power.216 States have varying approaches to public-
sector teachers unions, from outlawing them entirely217 to affording 
them limited protections compared to the Act218 to granting broader 
protections and allowing them to strike.219 By providing coast-to-coast 
protections for teachers working at charter schools, the Act may allow 
for experimentation in states where public-sector unions have 
traditionally been outlawed.220 This experimentation may be beneficial 
to invigorating the labor movement by testing the proposition that 
guaranteeing labor rights has a positive effect on the public education 
system. On the other hand, although a patchwork of labor laws may be 
less desirable for unions (and potentially employers) in general, a 
state’s validly enacted legislation on a subject inherently within its 
powers should still be respected. 
If public-school systems continue to seek out “portfolio” style 
management emphasizing turnaround schools, and teachers continue 
to want union protection, many new schools will fall under the Act that 
otherwise would have been governed by state labor acts in their 
previous iterations as traditional public schools.221 This shift in 
 
 216. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t 
is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States.”); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. 
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (“[L]ocal autonomy of school districts is a vital national 
tradition.”). 
 217. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (2014). I am grateful to 
Professors Malin and Kerchner for their analysis, which led me to the state statutes mentioned in 
this Section. 
 218. For example, Arizona makes bargaining with a representative a majority of employees 
has selected only optional, rather than required. Malin and Kerchner, supra note 74, at 912. 
 219. E.g., Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237, 247 (Colo. 1992) (en 
banc) (interpreting Colorado’s Industrial Relations Act to provide a qualified right to strike). 
 220. For a discussion of some of these implications, see Preston C. Green III, Bruce D. Baker 
& Joseph O. Oluwole, Having It Both Ways: How Charter Schools Try to Obtain Funding of 
Public Schools and the Autonomy of Private Schools, 63 EMORY L.J. 303, 317–18 (2014). 
 221. Tim Walker, NEA Steps Up Organizing Efforts in Non-Union Charter Schools, NEA 
TODAY (July 8, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://neatoday.org/2013/07/08/nea-steps-up-organizing-efforts-
in-non-union-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/MBL3-D6GT] (describing the “portfolio” 
approach and how it is encouraging labor organizing). The trouble with asserting jurisdiction over 
a traditional state matter is the effect on the regulatory scheme that already applies to schools 
receiving public funds. For instance, an educator’s role in the student-discipline process can be 
addressed in collective bargaining because it is a term and condition of employment. This 
condition may be pertinent for teachers at a charter school designated specifically for students 
with disciplinary issues within the public-school system, but managed by a nonprofit board. If 
union employees at a charter school organized under the Act file charges for failure to bargain 
over student discipline, the NLRB can order the school to bargain, and under the Supremacy 
Clause, the parties have to heed the order. If the state has chartered the school and addresses 
student discipline in the charter, the employer may have to violate the state charter to comply 
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coverage would strengthen the Act’s reach and provide more 
protections to the newly formed charter teachers unions, such as the 
right to strike, but at the expense of the states’ choice of labor policy. 
IV.  A REINVIGORATED HAWKINS COUNTY ANALYSIS FOR 
CHARTER SCHOOLS 
The NLRB’s current interpretation of its test for when an 
employer is an exempt political subdivision leads to only one result for 
most charter schools: NLRB jurisdiction over the labor dispute.222 This 
Part proposes an adjusted test for whether an employer is an exempt 
political subdivision, explains the benefits of a reinvigorated test, and 
applies the test to two existing decisions from Pennsylvania. 
Before the Chicago Mathematics case, some NLRB Regional 
Directors used a more robust measure to determine whether a charter 
school was a political subdivision. This fact-bound analysis used more 
criteria than whether the administration of the charter school was 
directly appointable or removable by government officials.223 A more 
robust, settled test would avoid the result of too many charter schools 
falling under NLRB jurisdiction while also allowing charter providers 
to account for the body of labor law applying to their schools without 
having to file repeated jurisdictional challenges. 
A more detailed view of both Hawkins County prongs would 
better address the changing scope of charter schools.224 Although a 
variety of facts may weigh on the NLRB’s decision under either prong, 
several emerge as the most likely to differentiate among types of 
charters and preserve the jurisdictional balance between state and 
federal labor agencies.225 
In applying Hawkins County, the NLRB should focus on, to a 
greater extent, the factors that track the similarities or differences 
 
with federal labor law. I borrowed the idea for this hypothetical from the AFT, AFL-CIO, and 
NEA’s amicus brief in Hyde Leadership. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Federation of 
Teachers, AFL-CIO and the National Education Association at 12–13, Hyde Leadership Charter 
School—Brooklyn, Case No. 29-RM-126444 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 24, 2016). 
 222. See supra Part III. 
 223. E.g., L.A. Leadership Acad., Case No. 31-RM-1281, at 3 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 2, 2006) 
(decision & order). 
 224. Although the NLRB has weighed many of these factors in its analysis, it has placed the 
most emphasis on factors that are unlikely to differentiate between charter schools, such as 
whether the board of directors was appointed directly by government officials. See supra notes 
164–73 and accompanying text.  
 225. For a discussion of these factors, see supra Part III. The Board’s current test has placed 
heavy weight on factors that are unlikely to differentiate among charter schools. 
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between charter schools and traditional public schools. The particular 
facts the NLRB should consider most salient—because they are the 
easiest way to distinguish whether a charter school is more like a public 
or private school—under Hawkins County’s first prong (created by a 
state or administrative arm of government) are: (1) the state’s 
characterization of the charter employer in its enabling legislation and 
overall statutory scheme, (2) the percentage of public funding the 
school receives, and (3) the school’s status as a default or 
“neighborhood” school for children in a certain catchment zone. 
The first two characteristics under this prong are unlikely to 
differentiate among many charters due to their ubiquity in most state 
charter-school schemes,226 but they should still be considered because 
they bear on whether a charter employer is an “administrative arm” of 
government. Many charter schools are likely to be characterized as 
“public” in state legislation.227 Additionally, many charter schools 
receive a large amount of public funding228 although charters receiving 
significant amounts of private funds—compared to the public funding 
they receive—would be more difficult to classify as an administrative 
arm. As a consequence, the third factor, whether the school is the 
default education provider229 for a given set of students, should weigh 
heavily on the analysis and differentiate between the increasingly 
various types of charter schools. It is here that the “administrative arm” 
is most visible, because the school is fulfilling the state’s statutory 
obligation to provide a free education to students. 
The most salient facts that the NLRB should consider under the 
second prong (administered by individuals responsible to public 
officials or the general electorate) of Hawkins County are: (1) the 
degree of government oversight of the charter-school board and (2) the 
 
 226. For a description of state enabling statutes and funding schemes, see WEIL, supra note 
11, at 80–82, 93–94.  
 227. For an examination of different state characterizations, see Green et al., supra note 220, 
at 305–07. 
 228. See WEIL, supra note 11, at 96 (“Although state funding formulas vary, they all attempt 
to provide a fair share of public funds for each student who wishes to attend a charter school.”); 
CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, Just the FAQs—Charter Schools, https://www.edreform.com/2012/ 
03/just-the-faqs-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/2HLK-2GPC] (“Like district public schools, 
they are funded according to enrollment (also called average daily attendance, or ADA), and 
receive funding from the district and the state according to the number of students attending.”).  
 229. The “default-education-provider” factor would consider the extent to which the school 
is required to serve certain students, by the district or the state. Thus the facts to consider would 
be whether the school may compose the student body by choice or lottery, or whether the 
enabling charter or school district determines the student body. For a discussion of how this 
differentiates among charter schools, see supra notes 54–64. 
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charter school’s reporting requirements. These factors are meant to 
elicit an examination of how similar a charter school is to the public 
schools in the area. Usually, local officials have limited supervisory 
powers over charter schools,230 but local school-district agreements 
with turnaround schools may infuse more accountability into the 
process. Because the nature of charter schools is changing, a more 
robust test will allow charter schools that act more like private schools 
to fall under NLRB jurisdiction while schools that act more like 
traditional public schools will fall under the pertinent state labor board. 
This Part outlines a more rigorous Hawkins Country test for charter 
schools in Section A, and it then applies the suggested test to two 
Philadelphia charter schools in Section B. 
A. Costs and Benefits of a Reinvigorated Analysis 
This suggestion for reinvigorating the NLRB’s analysis does not 
envision a wholesale retooling of the current test. Rather, it provides 
more teeth to areas of analysis that are likely to differentiate between 
traditional and newer forms of charter schools. This Section presents 
the benefits that a more robust Hawkins County analysis for charter 
schools would provide, namely benefits to the administration of the 
Act, to the federal–state balance, and to employers and employees 
themselves. 
First, a test that refocuses on what makes charters different from 
each other rather than what makes them different from public schools 
is more likely to yield meaningful results that account for the factual 
differences between charter schools. The NLRB’s current 
interpretation of the Hawkins County test does, in practical effect, 
create a bright-line rule for charter schools.231 A bright line is easy to 
apply, but so far it has led to nothing on the other side of the line. A 
more robust test would still protect the employees that the NLRB is 
seeking to protect, while simultaneously allowing employees who work 
for schools that have more in common with their public-school 
counterparts to seek the protections of their state labor laws. 
This benefit interlocks with the preservation of the federal–state 
balance. Given the factors that may lead to an expansion in 
 
 230. Frederick M. Hess, The Political Challenge of Charter School Regulation, 85 PHI DELTA 
KAPPAN 508, 509 (2004) (“The essential ‘deal’ implicit in charter schooling is that, in return for 
being freed from many of the rules and regulations endured by traditional district schools, 
charters are to be held accountable for their results.”).  
 231. See supra Part III. 
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unionization among charter teachers,232 a meaningful preservation of 
the federal–state balance for jurisdiction over union charter schools is 
necessary to avoid imposing federal labor law on a large sector of issues 
that have been traditionally left to the states.233 The NLRB’s Chicago 
Mathematics decision has already caused state labor boards to 
surrender jurisdiction over charter-school cases.234 This surrender has 
the effect of a feedback loop: if state labor agencies think the federal 
agency will exert jurisdiction and the state declines to exert jurisdiction, 
the federal agency will exert jurisdiction because the state did not. 
Especially given the NLRB’s current interest in expanding employee 
protections,235 a state declining jurisdiction over a dispute invites the 
extension of the national Act’s protections to that set of employees. 
Thus, although the NLRB stated that it was not creating a bright-line 
rule for charters, in effect, it has. In a state whose labor laws mirror the 
Act, this may have little effect on the employees themselves. In a state 
with considerable differences,236 however, the federal agency could 
trample the choices of elected officials and voters. 
Finally, there are benefits for employers and employees—not to 
mention students, teachers, and parents—when jurisdiction is clear and 
not continually challenged at both the federal and state level. 
Employers may not want to litigate jurisdiction due to the expense 
involved, and the public-relations concerns related to continuous fights 
with a union representing the majority of its employees.237 Union 
organizing is already divisive at charter schools in particular, where 
employees are encouraged to see themselves on the same “team” as 
 
 232. See supra Part II. 
 233. Labor disputes between state public-sector employers and their employees are typically 
governed by state labor laws. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (excluding public-sector employers 
from the NLRB’s jurisdiction). 
 234. See, e.g., Agora Cyber Charter Sch., Case No. PERA-C-12-146-E, at 1 (Pa. Labor 
Relations Bd. June 13, 2013) (referring to the NLRB’s decision in Chicago Mathematics and 
finding that “[b]ecause the National Board has asserted jurisdiction over private charter schools 
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Agora is not a public employer, within the meaning of 
PERA”). 
 235. See supra note 112. 
 236. For a discussion of potential differences between state labor laws and the Act, see supra 
Part II.C. 
 237. See Daniel Denvir, Aspira Offers No Answers on Charter School Financial Anomalies, 
PHILA. CITY PAPER: THE NAKED CITY (Apr. 8, 2014), http://citypaper.net/Blogs/Aspira-offers-
no-answers-on-charter-school-financial-anomalies [https://perma.cc/3WTU-QH47] (describing 
the public-relations issues a charter provider has exposed itself to by continuing to fight 
unionization at one of its schools). 
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management in order to improve efficiency and student outcomes.238 
Prolonged conflicts about which agency has jurisdiction risk deepening 
divisions in ways that do not benefit students239 or parents240 and that 
use limited education money to attempt to avoid unionization.241 
With the benefits of a more rigorous test for jurisdiction in mind, 
some examples show that this test is more appropriate for addressing 
the changing charter-school landscape than the NLRB’s current 
interpretation of Hawkins County. 
B. Applying a Revised Test to Two Philadelphia Charter Schools 
This Section applies the revised jurisdictional test described above 
to two charter schools in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.242 The two 
schools, John B. Stetson (Stetson) and Agora Cyber Charter (Agora), 
were selected because they are two types of charter schools that do not 
fit the traditional, quasi-private charter model described above in Part 
II and because their teachers have attempted to organize unions. 
Stetson was a neighborhood public middle school managed by the 
School District of Philadelphia until it was turned over to ASPIRA, a 
charter operator in Philadelphia, to continue operations as a 
 
 238. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 74, at 892 (“Managers share decision-making 
responsibility with employees, and function as coaches, facilitators, and integrators.”). 
 239. See Cassandra M.D. Hart & Aaron J. Sojourner, Unionization and Productivity: 
Evidence from Charter Schools 15 (Inst. for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper Series, 
Discussion Paper No. 7887, 2014), http://ftp.iza.org/dp7887.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3PQ-YZHB] 
(“While there is some evidence that student performance dips around the time of unionization, it 
seems to rebound to previous levels within a few years.”). 
 240. See Vevea, supra note 93 (“[F]or students and parents at Chicago Math and Science 
Academy, perhaps the most important concern is not whether teachers unionize, but rather what 
the conflict is doing to the school.”). 
 241. See Denvir, supra note 237 (“Aspira has paid . . . a law firm with expertise in fighting 
unionization efforts, at least $72,163.33 for Olney-related matters, according to seven 2013 
invoices.”). 
 242. As compared with other cities, and similar to Chicago, Philadelphia has experienced an 
increase in organizing activity in charter schools. This increase may be partially explained by the 
rapid expansion of the charter model in the city as well as the school district actively seeking to 
convert its existing public schools to charters. See 012: Renaissance Schools Initiative Policy, SCH. 
DIST. OF PHILA., http://www.phila.k12.pa.us/offices/administration/policies/012.html 
[https://perma.cc/6QCA-YD37] (“[T]he School District is seeking innovative ways to transform 
low-performing schools through new school models that include . . . external partnerships.”). 
Additionally, the American Federation of Teachers has several union organizers in Philadelphia, 
and this capacity helps charter-school teachers to unionize more easily. Cf. Cohen, supra note 15 
(describing union organizing efforts in Philadelphia and other cities). 
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neighborhood school.243 Agora is a cyber charter school, a model that 
is growing in popularity for parents who do not want to send their 
children to a brick-and-mortar school or for students who want to make 
up significant numbers of class credits to graduate.244 In cyber charter 
schools, students take classes online and attend either by reporting to 
a computer lab that is monitored by teachers, or by attending cyber 
classes taught by teachers at a remote location, from computers in their 
home.245 
Under a reinvigorated Hawkins County test, as explained below, 
the first school, Stetson, would be found to be a public employer 
(exempt from the Act), while the second school, Agora, would be 
found to be a private employer (subject to the Act). 
1. John B. Stetson Charter School.  In the case of Stetson, a 
Regional Board Director found the charter school was not a political 
subdivision.246 An analysis under this proposed test, however, would 
lead to the charter provider, ASPIRA, being considered a political 
subdivision and therefore falling under state labor law similar to 
existing public schools. 
First, Pennsylvania law provides for the establishment of charter 
schools, which are authorized by the local school district, under the 
Pennsylvania Charter School Law.247 Stetson is a turnaround school, 
which means it was created by converting an existing public school.248 
The local classification of the charter school is also pertinent here. The 
School District of Philadelphia, through its “Renaissance Initiative,” 
introduced a portfolio model in which eligible “low-performing” public 
schools were identified and—through a process requiring stakeholder 
consent—were turned over to charter providers.249 These schools were 
required to continue to serve the students within their defined 
geographical boundary in an attempt to bring the perceived benefits of 
 
 243. John N. Mitchell, Charter Schools Showing Promise, PHILA. TRIB. (Sept. 29, 2011, 12:00 
AM), http://www.phillytrib.com/news/charter-schools-showing-promise/article_0e02b0bc-6df7-
5f3e-9de1-71efc7c95748.html [https://perma.cc/8F32-FGB6].  
 244. See generally Huerta, d’Entremont & Gonzalez, supra note 147 (explaining the basic 
characteristics of cyber charter schools and some issues with holding them accountable for student 
outcomes).  
 245. Id. 
 246. John B. Stetson Charter Sch., Case No. 04-RC-151011, at 1 (N.L.R.B. May 14, 2015) 
(decision and direction of election). 
 247. 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1729-A (West 2016).  
 248. Id. § 17-1729-A(b)(1).  
 249. SCH. DIST. OF PHILA., supra note 242. 
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charter schools to more students.250 The School District of Philadelphia 
then provided funding, resources, and training to aid the turnaround.251 
Furthermore, Stetson receives most of its funding from the state.252 
In fiscal year 2013, Stetson received $9,450,666 in revenues for its 
general fund253 from local, state, and federal sources.254 It received 
$1,583 from “other sources.”255 This revenue amounts to .016 percent 
of its total funding. By contrast, other charter schools receive 
significant funding per pupil from private sources.256 
Stetson’s classification as a “turnaround,” rather than a “new-
start” charter, also bears on the analysis. The fact that the School 
District of Philadelphia turned over an existing “underperforming”257 
public school to ASPIRA would weigh in favor of the school being 
considered a political subdivision. In this case, rather than starting a 
new charter school, Stetson is the default neighborhood school for 
students in the catchment area.258 This classification means that 
students who live within a certain zone in North Philadelphia will 
attend Stetson unless their parents enroll them elsewhere.259 The 
District website lists Stetson as a public school with the same name as 
 
 250. See Paul Socolar, Renaissance Schools: The Basics, PHILA. PUB. SCH. NOTEBOOK (Jan. 
27, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://thenotebook.org/articles/2010/01/27/renaissance-schools-the-basics 
[https://perma.cc/S936-G7MB] (“The District has committed to accomplishing these ‘school 
turnarounds’ while serving the same students at these schools.”). 
 251. Id. 
 252. WITHUMSMITH+BROWN, PC, JOHN B. STETSON CHARTER SCHOOL, AN ASPIRA, INC. 
OF PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 10 
(2013), http://aspirapa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Stetson-audit-FY-13.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/4B32-8AV2]. 
 253. The school receives additional funding from state and federal sources to provide free and 
reduced school lunches and from other local sources for student activities. Id.  
 254. Id.  
 255. Id. 
 256. For example, a study of KIPP’s schools showed that they received $5,700 per pupil, on 
average, from private sources in 2008. Valerie Strauss, Separating Fact from Fiction in 21 Claims 
About Charter Schools, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
answer-sheet/wp/2015/02/28/separating-fact-from-fiction-in-21-claims-about-charter-schools 
[https://perma.cc/BW7V-T79W].  
 257. John B. Stetson Charter Sch., Case No. 04-RC-151011, at 4 (N.L.R.B. May 14, 2015) 
(decision & direction of election). 
 258. See John B. Stetson Charter Sch., Case No. 04-RC-151011, at 12 (N.L.R.B. May 19, 2015) 
(employer’s request for review of the Regional Director’s decision and direction of election) 
(discussing the Renaissance Initiative’s policy of requiring the turnaround charters to remain 
neighborhood schools enrolling from a specific catchment area).  
 259. This was a decision by the Philadelphia School District as part of the its “Renaissance 
Schools” initiative, designed to take the first steps toward a portfolio model and bring the 
purported benefits of charter schools to more students in the district. 
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the original John B. Stetson public school, and its charter requires it to 
enroll students from within a defined catchment area.260 
Under the second prong of Hawkins County, government officials 
are more involved in Stetson’s affairs than in other, more traditional 
charter schools. Its charter requires it to report to the Philadelphia 
School District about progress in certain metrics, whereas other 
schools do not have to report progress.261 School District officials also 
have more leeway to cancel Stetson’s charter.262 This heightened 
oversight illustrates that a more detailed analysis under the second 
prong can capture and account for some of the facts that make a 
turnaround charter school like Stetson different from a traditional 
new-start charter. 
Under the application of either prong of a revised Hawkins 
County test, Stetson—as a turnaround charter with more similarities to 
existing public neighborhood schools—would be considered an exempt 
political subdivision, and its labor dispute would be subject to 
Pennsylvania’s Public Employee Relations Board. 
2. Agora Cyber Charter.  Unlike Stetson, Agora should be 
considered a private employer subject to the Act. Under the first prong 
of a reinvigorated Hawkins County test, Agora presents facts similar to 
most traditional public schools. Agora is not a traditional brick-and-
mortar charter school, but Pennsylvania Law explicitly provides for the 
creation of cyber charter schools and defines them as “public,” just as 
it does brick-and-mortar charter schools.263 Moreover, Agora receives 
 
 260. See id. at 21 (quoting Stetson’s charter agreement with the school district that it must 
“enroll all students who reside in the Stetson School catchment area . . . [and] may not enroll any 
students who live outside the Attendance Zone”).  
 261. Id. at 14. For instance, Stetson was notorious for being the only middle school on 
Pennsylvania’s “persistent dangerous schools list,” and its progress in being taken off the list was 
one of the reports it had to make to the school district. Id. 
 262. Id. (quoting testimony from the regional board director hearing that the school district 
could revoke the charter mid-term, unlike other charter schools which can only be revoked at the 
five-year-renewal mark). In fact, at the time this Note was written, the School District had issued 
several warnings to Stetson to be more transparent with its financials or risk having its charter 
revoked. Regina Medina, School District to ASPIRA: Fix Up Your School, PHILA. DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 5, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-03-06/news/59812735_1_charter-renewal-charter-
school-office-charter-office [https://perma.cc/N7PC-YJMW].  
 263. See 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1703-A (West 2016). The statute defines a 
cyber charter school as 
an independent public school established and operated under a charter from the 
Department of Education and in which the school uses technology in order to provide 
a significant portion of its curriculum and to deliver a significant portion of 
instruction . . . through the Internet or other electronic means.  
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its funding from state and federal sources264 and from Pennsylvania 
school districts under a formula that provides Agora with the district’s 
avoided cost of educating a student.265 Other sources of funding were 
not listed on Agora’s financial report.266 
Therefore, the dispositive factor in differentiating Agora from 
Stetson is its status as a quasi-private charter school whose student 
body is composed by the choice of the parents and students. Unlike a 
traditional public school, Agora does not serve a given geographic 
area; it enrolls students who choose to attend it.267 So Agora is not 
required to enroll students by default based on their residence.268 There 
is also no provision of the Pennsylvania state law that would allow for 
a public school to be converted into a cyber charter school, so Agora 
would not be eligible for turnaround status. 
Pertinent to the second prong of Hawkins County, Agora is run by 
a for-profit charter provider, K12 Inc.269 Although this factor is not 
dispositive in an analysis of whether a charter school is an 
administrative arm of the government, it should matter in terms of 
 
Id. 
 264. Notably, even though it is a cyber charter, Agora receives the same amount of money 
per pupil from the local school district to pay for the cost of educating an individual student as 
brick-and-mortar charter schools do. Agora, however, has been sending a large amount of this 
taxpayer money to its for-profit charter operator parent. See Kevin McCorry, Temple Prof: Pa. 
Cyber Charters Turning Huge Profits, Sending Tax Dollars out of State, NEWSWORKS (Jan. 6, 
2014), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/education/63557-temple-prof-pa-cyber-
charters-turning-huge-profits-sending-tax-dollars-out-of-state [https://perma.cc/CV5T-RLET] 
(“Agora has a management contract with the national for-profit K-12 [sic] Inc. [Professor] 
DeJarnatt found that Agora paid K-12 [sic] Inc. $14,967,243 in 2010.”). 
 265. MAILLIE LLP, AGORA CYBER CHARTER SCHOOL: ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT, 
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2013, at 6, http://www.k12.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Agora-audit-report-
063013-042114.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7RC-M8WQ].  
 266. Id. This could be due to the fact that Agora does not require outside funding to educate 
its students remotely. 
 267. See Enrollment, AGORA CYBER CHARTER SCH., http://www.agora.org/enrollment 
[https://perma.cc/DAJ4-FQ8W] (defining enrollment eligibility only by age and successful 
completion of the enrollment application). 
 268. Id.  
 269. Agora Cyber Charter Sch., Case No. PERA-C-12-146-E, at 1 (Pa. Labor Relations Bd. 
June 13, 2013). Agora may not be run by a for-profit in the future, as it is seeking to cut its ties 
with K12 and be managed by a nonprofit company to increase its chances of being re-chartered 
by the state. See Bill Raden, Cyber Charter Revolt Against K12 Inc. Continues, CAPITAL AND 
MAIN (Sept. 3, 2014), http://capitalandmain.com/features/california-expose/cyber-charter-school-
revolt-against-k12-inc-continues [https://perma.cc/3JHY-7HCT] (citing a teacher’s statement that 
Agora’s board president told staff about “current conversations that are happening between the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education and the Agora board . . . without K12, our application 
looks better” (emphasis added)). 
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whether the board of directors has accountability to shareholders in 
addition to accountability to public officials and the general electorate. 
This distinction would matter if, for instance, a decision about whether 
to implement certain practices to improve test scores—a form of 
business outcome—would have negative impacts on Special Education 
students or English Language Learners. The divided accountability 
means that the school seems more similar to a private school than an 
administrative arm of government. 
Additionally, although Agora has reporting requirements as a 
cyber charter and is overseen by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education,270 its requirements are not as stringent as those of local 
public schools. Pennsylvania established uniform rules for charter 
oversight, including cyber charter schools, but local school boards may 
retain greater oversight for turnaround schools, as Philadelphia does 
for Stetson and its other “Renaissance Schools.”271 These more 
stringent rules do not apply to Agora as a cyber charter. Therefore, 
government officials’ oversight of Agora does not differ from 
traditional charter schools in a way that would make Agora’s board of 
directors responsible to public officials or the general electorate. Thus, 
under either prong of a revised Hawkins County test, Agora would be 
considered a private employer and therefore subject to the 
requirements of the Act. 
The NLRB’s current test, with its blunt emphasis on whether the 
charter school board members are appointable or removable by 
government officials, would not differentiate between Stetson and 
Agora. Both would be considered private due to the composition of 
 
 270. See PA. DEP’T OF EDUC., BASIC EDUCATION CIRCULAR: CYBER CHARTER SCHOOLS 
(Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.education.pa.gov/Documents/Codes%20and%20Regulations/Basic%
20Education%20Circulars/Purdons%20Statutes/Cyber%20Charter%20Schools.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6TBU-7W6N ]. The Basic Education Circular notes that  
section 1741-A has established certain powers and duties upon PDE. Those duties 
include annually assessing:  
  1. whether a cyber charter school is meeting the goals of its charter;  
  2. whether a cyber charter school is in compliance with its charter; and,  
  3. the cyber charter school’s performance on . . . standardized tests . . . .  
Id. 
 271. See, e.g., Socolar, supra note 250. Socolar notes that 
[e]ach Renaissance School will be required to meet annual targets for accelerating 
academic achievement and for improving school climate, student retention, promotion 
rates, parent and student satisfaction, and (for high schools) college readiness and 
graduation rates. . . . If the District determines that annual targets are not being met, 
the superintendent may replace the turnaround team or return the school to being a 
regular District school. 
Id. 
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their boards. Under a reinvigorated analysis, however, Stetson’s union 
would be governed by state labor laws because it is more similar to a 
traditional public school, and Agora’s would be governed by the Act 
because it is more similar to private schools. 
CONCLUSION 
The rapid expansion of the charter-school model calls for 
reexamination of the existing legal frameworks governing charters. 
Labor law is one such framework. Charter schools—although initially 
considered laboratories for innovation and experimentation in smaller, 
less restrictive settings—have increasingly taken on the role of the 
traditional public education system. In cities like New Orleans—where 
the public education system has struggled for entire generations of 
students—the “portfolio model” of turning over public schools to 
charter providers has become increasingly popular. When these 
charters unionize, the agency with jurisdiction over the labor dispute 
should be clear to the employer as well as the employees. 
The current NLRB jurisdiction test is not robust enough to 
differentiate between traditional charter schools and these new 
turnaround charters. Charter schools’ stories are rich with detail and 
cannot be limited to simply looking at the composition of the charter 
school’s board and whether its members are appointable or removable 
by government officials. A change to the current test will require 
examining whether the charter school is the default education provider 
in a given area or if it is another choice, making it more similar to a 
private school. This change will effectively differentiate between those 
schools that are serving the function of an “administrative arm” of 
government and those that are attempting to offer parents the choice 
of a private school. One of the main benefits that charters offer is an 
approach to education that is not one-size-fits-all. A parent can choose 
between sending his child to Stetson or Agora. Thus, the NLRB’s 
interpretation of the Hawkins County test for jurisdiction should 
effectively account for the types of choices that make the charter 
movement a viable alternative to traditional public schools. This 
differentiation will in turn allow employers and employees to better 
understand the law that may apply to their actions while minimizing 
unnecessarily prolonged unionization battles and preserving state 
jurisdiction over public-sector employee unions. 
